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Introduction:  
Non-Knowledge and 
Digital Cultures
Matthias Koch
Digital media today are accompanied by emphatic 
stances on knowledge, non-knowledge, and their 
relation to one another. Generating, distributing, 
and making available massive amounts of data 
that take form by modeling, digital media provide 
us with abundant information and potentially 
new ways of gaining knowledge. This has been 
attracting various, sometimes radical scenarios 
in which technology either eliminates non-
knowledge or plants it deep within contemporary 
cultures, due to the alleged universal power and 
opacity of algorithms. Both conceptualizing and 
researching non-knowledge have proven to be 
epistemological challenges that are key to under-
standing contemporary digital cultures. 
12 The great number of twentieth and twenty-first century dis-
courses on non-knowledge can, among other factors, be linked 
to such diverse aspects as automatization and media historical 
developments, risk management, a rise in prognostics, ecological 
and social developments, or the perception of a general rise in 
complexity (Wehling 2009). Non-knowledge has shown to be a 
pervasive topic, be it in political and economic debates, amongst 
the general public or in a huge number of academic fields. In the 
latter, the twentieth century saw a strongly growing interest in 
epistemology, in criticizing traditional concepts of knowledge, 
in unveiling and analyzing unquestioned premises of research, 
ideas of self-evidence, and blind spots. From a perspective of 
contemporary history directed at the status of digital media, 
the broad and often emphatic discussions of non-knowledge 
may be seen as a “symptom of a fundamental uncertainty about 
our mechanized life-world” (Burkhardt 2017, 57, translated by 
the author). At the same time, histories and theories of non-
knowledge need to reflect on themselves as being part of a long-
standing tradition of questioning the status of knowledge—a 
temporal horizon going way beyond the twentieth century, with 
roots in antique skepticism or the philosophies of enlightenment.
When dealing with these debates and the problems they 
articulate, a characteristic terminological diversity quickly 
becomes apparent. In the English language, non-knowledge, 
nescience, and ignorance, with the latter arguably being the 
most common one, all concern closely related problems (for 
an attempt at theoretical differentiation cf. Gross 2010, 53–56). 
While these expressions each have individual etymologies and 
conceptual histories, they share a semantic field and the attempt 
to signify something that poses grave epistemological problems 
to conceptualization. Therefore, speaking of Non-knowledge 
and Digital Cultures neither excludes other existing terms nor 
does it claim to deliver a theory exclusively tied to this expres-
sion. Rather, emphasizing the expression non-knowledge serves 
13to direct attention to “the ‘natural’ reverse side of knowledge” 
(Gross 2016, 313), i.e. to their reciprocal relation. 
Corresponding to the great diversity of thematic contexts in 
which non-knowledge is being discussed, there is a huge variety 
when it comes to analytically determining that which is called 
non-knowledge. For example, non-knowledge can be regarded as 
factual absence of knowledge, as a conscious or non-conscious 
state of not knowing something. This notion can, for example, 
be virulent in questions about the relation between the growth 
of knowledge and the respective growth of non-knowledge 
in science, in taking non-knowledge as a productive force, 
in differentiations between unspecified and specified non-
knowledge, in assumptions about fundamentally unknowable 
things (“Ignorabimus”), in a conscious or non-conscious attitude 
of ignoring facts or a decision not to know something, or in 
intentionally obfuscating knowledge and keeping another party 
from knowing. Here, the expression non-knowledge stands in 
for something that is not, not yet, or not supposed to be known, 
that is not at all accessible, that is a result of ignoring facts or 
that is concomitant with gaining knowledge. Non-knowledge in 
this sense may be seen as an obstacle in need of overcoming, 
as a necessity in the development of knowledge, or even as a 
fundamental human right, i.e. in the case of debates on genetic 
diagnostics. 
One of the key epistemological aspects in these and many other 
contexts is whether the relation between non-knowledge and 
knowledge is modeled as an oppositional one (non-knowledge 
not being knowledge) or as a complementary one (non-knowledge 
being the flipside of knowledge). It seems more productive to 
describe this relation in the latter sense: given, for example, that 
the conscious or non-conscious determination of anything as 
knowledge, knowable, or worthy of knowing will always entail the 
exclusion of something else as non-knowledge, not knowable, 
or ignorable. Also, in research, theoretical framework, selection 
of sources, hypotheses, institutional factors, social contexts 
14 and structures of power lead to both including and excluding 
specific questions and topics. Furthermore, only when reflecting 
upon this complementary relation does it become possible to 
acknowledge and discuss the structuring function of the non-
conscious structures and regularities of cultural techniques, 
tacit knowing, or historical a prioris, i.e. the non-conscious ratio 
constitutive of individual and collective practices. In return, con-
ceptualizing non-knowledge this way necessarily determines the 
assessment of research itself, a relation prominently represented 
by a certain understanding of media theory. 
The specific methodology of media knowledge displays itself 
in the insistent relation that it maintains to non-knowledge. 
… [It] sounds out the conditions of … rules of enunciation 
insofar as they cannot be perceived or are constitutively 
occluded. (Holl 2015, 84) 
One could argue that non-knowledge, ignorance, or nescience 
—expressions rather than termini technici—are conceptually 
productive, both individually and as parts of a shared semantic 
field, precisely because they are logically underdetermined. In 
other words, the logical ambiguity and negativity of these expres-
sions correspond to the characteristics of what they try to grasp. 
They are reminiscent of the way in which, drawing on Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, floating signifiers work. These signifiers “occur to 
represent an indeterminate value of signification, in itself devoid 
of meaning and thus susceptible of receiving any meaning at 
all; their sole function is to fill a gap between signifier and the 
signified” (Lévi-Strauss 1987, 55f.). Building on Lévi-Strauss, 
Ernesto Laclau speaks of empty signifiers: being universalistic 
and underdetermined at the same time, their function lies in 
stabilizing hegemonic discourses. Such a signifier represents 
the “theoretical possibility of something that indicates the dis-
cursive presence of its own limits from within the process of 
signifying” (Laclau 1996, 36). An empty signifier stands in for a 
structural impossibility of signifying. Laclau’s critical view would 
serve well in discussing the political implications and biases of 
15non-knowledge discourses, e.g., regarding debates on Big Data, 
surveillance, and the right to anonymity. 
Despite the differences between the aforementioned aspects of 
that which is called non-knowledge, ignorance, or nescience, the 
difficulties of gaining insight into it are what these expressions 
have in common: all of them logically determine non-knowledge 
primarily via its opacity and implicitness. In this sense, all of them 
rest on the term being a signifier without a fixable signified. Given 
that the term non-knowledge points to something that, logically 
speaking, is a negative, conceptualizing it as a floating or empty 
signifier could highlight some key difficulties in signification.
Discussing the epistemological challenges tied to non-knowledge 
and its relation to knowledge is of great value to digital cultures 
research. It brings up the question of whether digital technology 
goes along with a qualitatively new mode of entangling knowing 
and not knowing. This question currently fuels vast amounts 
of research, attracting both emphatic stances on the alleged 
revolutionary nature of digital technology and careful, tentative 
descriptions of the historical, technological, and epistemological 
conditions of knowing and not knowing today. One prominent 
topos in current research is that at the core of contemporary 
media culture there is a fundamental epistemic opacity (Hum-
phreys 2009), which relates to thoughts about the unrepresent-
ability of algorithms (Galloway 2012, 78–100) and their govern-
mental power (Rouvroy 2011). Other key factors for this opacity 
are found in the ubiquity of digital media and their deep insertion 
into all sorts of everyday practices, perception, and body 
techniques, leading up to a “transformation of the contemporary 
affective fabrics” (Baxmann, Beyes, and Pias 2012, 9, translated 
by the author). All-encompassing and altering the capacities of 
sensation, such a situation has been called an ecology of affect 
(Angerer 2017). 
All this makes digital cultures research a prominent case of the 
perceived contemporary crisis of representation, and focusing on 
16 non-knowledge promises to deliver valuable insights into these 
epistemological dilemmas. It implies discussing the means, range, 
and limits of current scientific description and understanding. 
It also highlights the basic questions of what is thought of as 
known/not known and knowable/not knowable today, the various 
historical contexts of today’s situation, and even the question of 
whether one can operationalize non-knowledge to learn about 
digital cultures. Relating non-knowledge to digital cultures may 
not only tell us something about the status of digital media as a 
topic of research, it may also tell us something about the status of 
contemporary interdisciplinary media research itself. 
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The Total Archive: On 
the Function of Non-
Knowledge in Digital 
Cultures
Andreas Bernard
This article tries to combine two tendencies in 
digital cultures. On the one hand, search engines 
and social media seem to erase former gaps of 
knowledge that in the history of literature and 
film, from Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex to the Hollywood 
romantic comedy, were crucial to the tragic or 
comical plots. On the other hand, this abundance 
of knowledge, all these electronic encyclopedias 
and social connections in our pockets, is organized 
by a set of algorithms and computational per-
formances that are unknown and even myterious 
to their users. The article discusses this simulta-
neous growth of knowledge and non-knowledge in 
digital cultures. The total archive of our presence 
produces new illegibilities.
20 1
Although the movie is only 15 years old, its story seems to belong 
to some strange and distant past. Serendipity, starring John 
Cusack and Kate Beckinsale, was one of the most successful box 
office hits of 2001. In the film, a man and a woman get to know 
one another by chance while Christmas shopping; after a few 
intimate hours spent together in Manhattan, the two of them, 
each in a steady relationship of their own, part ways without 
even bothering to learn the other’s first name. “Do you think,” 
the man asks in parting, “good old fate is just gonna deliver my 
information right to your doorstep?” The woman then convinces 
him to write down his full name and telephone number on a five-
dollar bill, which she immediately gives away to a street vendor. 
If they are truly meant for one another, she implies, then the bill 
containing his information will somehow make it back into her 
hands. To be fair, she then writes her own name and telephone 
number inside a book, which, in the same spirit of anonymity and 
unpredictability, she sells to a used bookstore on the following 
day. Years go by, and the circulating tokens of love do ultimately 
bring the destined couple back together, though their reunion 
occurs shortly before the man’s scheduled wedding.
Today, a plot such as Serendipity ’s would inevitably fall apart not 
long after the first scene. It is no longer conceivable that two 
young people would share a nice time together and then part 
ways without saying “connect with me on Facebook” or having 
gathered enough information to google each other. Some time 
ago, the actor Tom Hanks remarked in an interview that the cell 
phone had ruined many of the traditions of romantic comedy 
because everyone can call anyone at any time or pictures can be 
taken that would let the truth out of the bag. In that particular 
genre, to which Hanks made several of his own successful con-
tributions during the 1990s (Sleepless in Seattle or You’ve Got Mail), 
the storylines are typically driven by knowledge gaps: a man and 
a woman fall in love with one another, but they do so without 
21knowing the other’s true identity, or they are separated after a 
brief encounter. After a series of complications and misunder-
standings, they finally come together in a happy ending.
The current media reality has largely eliminated this 
dramaturgical principle. Stories of this sort are simply no 
longer thinkable given that smartphones can be consulted at 
any time. In 1999, it was still more or less possible to transplant 
Ernst Lubitsch’s classic 1940 film The Shop Around the Corner, 
in which two employees who dislike one another unwittingly 
begin a romantic exchange of letters, into the age of email 
correspondence. In You’ve Got Mail, Tom Hanks and Meg Ryan can 
simultaneously fight with each other as business competitors 
and begin a love affair on the Internet because anonymous 
chatrooms, misleading AOL addresses, and the lack of search 
engines still made it possible to conceal one’s identity. During 
the last 15 years, however, throughout which the availability 
and classification of data have probably brought about greater 
changes than took place during the 500 years between Gutenberg 
and Google, it would have been rather silly to revive a plot of this 
sort: social networks and dating apps have since constrained 
their users with strict controls over the genuineness and con-
sistency of online profiles. The traditional driving forces behind 
such movies have thus become ineffective, and in this light it 
is perhaps no surprise that each of the most successful recent 
comedies—the Hangover trilogy from 2009 to 2013—requires 
its main characters to have a total blackout after the rowdy 
night before. Because the Web 2.0 fills in all of the gaps in the 
characters’ knowledge of their everyday activity, drugs and 
alcohol are all that remains to bring about the amnesia that is so 
essential to any comedy of errors.
2
To some extent, the following reflections have been inspired by 
Hanks’ remarks. As politicians and economists have repeatedly 
22 told us, we are now living in a “knowledge economy.” The 
creation, dissemination, and application of knowledge have 
long supplanted the production of material goods as the most 
significant economic factor. Non-knowledge has thus come to 
be understood more than ever as an unavoidable deficit. The 
crisis of the “romantic comedy” is only an obvious indication 
that, wherever possible, a sort of historical countercurrent has 
also been developing: this countercurrent is characterized by the 
increasing suspicion among cultural theorists and social scientists 
that a certain degree of non-knowledge might, in fact, be nec-
essary for the organization and implementation of particular 
events and processes. In light of our digitally organized culture, I 
would like to pose the following question: What is the function of 
non-knowledge as we come closer and closer to producing a total 
archive of the present?
Since the beginning of this century, steps to fulfill digital 
technology’s ongoing promise of “networking” have been 
made with remarkable intensity—first, by the establishment 
of search engines, since 2005, in the form of social media, and 
most recently by the so-called Internet of Things. Data, people, 
services, and objects are now constantly connected to one 
another; according to some of the trendiest terminology, they 
are said to “communicate,” to reveal their location, to “share,” 
and to “be shared.” My first interest is thus concerned with the 
relationship of this ubiquitous networking, which is, of course, 
also a form of ubiquitous identification, to the history and 
status of human imagination. On the one hand, this involves an 
examination of such cultural products as literature and film; on 
the other hand, however, it also involves an analysis of forms of 
subjective fantasies, desires, and reminiscences. The latter are 
not simply arbitrary and timeless emotions; rather, they each 
have their own pertinent history. They react, for instance, to the 
ways in which technical media happen to transform ideas into 
realities.
23Tracking down the most relevant and effective characters in the 
canon of tragedies and comedies makes it immediately clear that 
the non-knowledge between the actors has a sort of elementary 
significance. Gaps in communication and interrupted con-
nections—either preordained or brought about by intrigue—are 
what provide dramas with irreparable guilt or the joy of playfully 
resolved misunderstandings.
From Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex to Shakespeare’s tragic and 
comic heroes and on through the personae of classical and 
late-bourgeois drama, the non-knowledge of the characters 
is constitutive for what takes place in the works. Paul Valéry’s 
dictum that “man can only act because he is capable of not 
knowing” is above all an expression of a poetological truth, 
and it is telling that the most influential theoretical treatments 
of the laws of poetry situate this dynamic at the center of their 
expositions. “The most powerful elements of emotional inter-
est in tragedy,” as Aristotle remarked in his Poetics, are “the 
reversal of circumstances (peripeteia) and the recognition scenes” 
(1450a32). According to Aristotle, these turning points in the 
story—these “changes from ignorance to knowledge”—constitute 
the “foundation” and “soul” of the characters being represented 
(1452a).
If it is indeed true that the “romantic comedy” is threatening to 
sink forever into the networking maelstrom of digital media, then 
this development certainly has much to do with the narrative 
stasis caused by exhaustively profiled identities and relation-
ships. On the one hand, it seems as though today’s most popular 
love stories, such as Pascal Mercier’s best-selling Night Train 
to Lisbon, are only able to maintain their ostensible realism at 
the cost of ignoring technological developments (the protag-
onist’s entire journey could just as well have been replaced by a 
little Internet research). On the other hand, this stagnation has 
resulted in the success of backwards-oriented narrative worlds in 
which the current constellations of knowledge do not pertain. The 
somewhat disconcerting boom of the fantasy genre in literature, 
24 film, and on television has been going strong for several years—
think of the Tolkien renaissance, the spectacular success of the 
Harry Potter stories, and the universally acclaimed medievalistic 
television series Game of Thrones. I believe it is possible to 
associate this boom with today’s media reality and its narrative 
and imaginative consequences.
3
As regards non-knowledge, what interests me in a broader sense 
is an epistemological perspective that could perhaps be called 
a technological history of imagination—a type of history that is 
concerned with imagination’s architectonic, infrastructural, com-
munications-technical, and transportation-technical conditions 
at a given time. Such interrelations play not only a significant 
role in our present day; they were also of great concern, for 
instance, to the authors writing during the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries. The latter was an epoch in which 
many of today’s fundamental questions about digital culture 
were first raised (as Jeannie Moser argues in her contribution 
to this volume): Should we be enthusiastic or skeptical about 
encyclopedic projects? What is the relationship between the sov-
ereign subject and overwhelming masses of data? What are the 
acceptable manners of representing knowledge about human 
beings?
In a remarkable entry in his “Scrapbooks,” written in the 1770s 
and given the simple title “Novels,” Georg Christoph Lichtenberg 
recorded his reflections about this very issue of the relation-
ship between knowledge, non-knowledge, and the literary 
imagination. It is worthwhile quoting this passage at some length:
Our way of life has become so simple now, and all our 
customs so free of mystery … that a man who wants to write 
a German novel hardly knows how to bring people together 
or tie together the knots of a story. Because German 
mothers today almost always breastfeed their own children, 
25the possibility of exchanging children has disappeared, and 
thus a source of literary invention has been obstructed that 
can hardly be compensated for with any money. … In Eng-
land, moreover, chimneys function not merely as channels 
for smoke but mainly as ventilation shafts in bedrooms, and 
thus they provide immediate and undetectable access to 
any given place in a house. … In Germany, however, a lover 
would hardly cut a pleasant appearance if he opted to climb 
down a chimney. … Finally, a genuine obstacle to intrigue 
is the otherwise fine and praiseworthy institution of post 
directors in Germany … and the fact that, instead of English 
stagecoaches and machines—in which a pregnant princess 
would feel neither shame nor fear to travel—we have rather 
introduced the open-air garbage carts that are so dear 
to us. The opportunities for mischief provided by these 
comfortable English coaches do not need to be expressed 
with words. First of all, if a girl and her lover run away from 
London in the evening, they could be in France before the 
father wakes up. … In Germany, however, even if the father 
realized that his daughter was missing three days after the 
fact, it would be enough to know that they traveled with the 
post in order to catch up with them by horse at the third 
station. (Lichtenberg 1968, 373–377, translated by the  
author)
Lichtenberg’s concern in this passage is, as he wrote, the “source 
of literary invention,” which can be “obstructed” or expedited 
by infrastructural realities. The practice of breastfeeding one’s 
own children, which was established in Germany and France 
during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the varying 
sizes of chimneys from one country to another, and the speed of 
stagecoaches each exert a degree of influence over the narrative 
possibilities in different national literatures—and, as far as 
genealogical origins or the escape routes of lovers are concerned, 
it is always non-knowledge that constitutes the dynamic of a 
given plot. 
26 A few years later, in 1812, Friedrich Schlegel posed a rather similar 
question in his lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and 
Modern. In comparison with some of his treasured books such as 
Don Quixote, Schlegel believed that contemporary German fiction 
was lacking in vitality, and this he attributed to an “all-too-strong 
and perfected bourgeois order” that had since been established. 
Inhibited by the “transparency” or “clarity” of present social 
relations, as Schlegel called them, German novelists were forced 
to seek “some sort of opening or access into a domain in which 
fantasy or the imagination can move freely.” “The romantic 
element in many of these second-rate romances,” he went on, 
“seems to coincide very closely with a state of morals disposed 
to set at defiance magisterial authority.” And then he added the 
following prognosis: 
Whenever the economy of municipal arrangements shall be 
perfected in general police so as to prevent all contraband 
trading, and so vigilantly detective as to sketch not only the 
physiognomy but also the biography of every traveler on his 
passport, romance will become obsolete, from the want of 
necessary materials. (Schlegel 1859, 259)1
4
As mentioned at the beginning, the productive force of non-
knowledge has recently begun to attract a considerable amount 
of attention in cultural studies and the social sciences. In light 
of the prominent theoretical impulses of the last few decades, 
the present interest in non-knowledge seems quite logical; it is a 
category that has long played an eminent role, at least implicitly. 
For the fact of the matter is that—in the wake of Canguilhem, 
Foucault, Kittler, Rheinberger, and rediscovered authors such 
as Ludwik Fleck—disciplines such as the history of science and 
1 These passages by Lichtenberg and Schlegel were brought to my attention 
by Bernd Seiler’s fascinating study, Die leidigen Tatsachen, published in 1983.
27historical epistemology have been characterized by a process 
of desemantization: what has taken the place of reconstructing 
the scientific truth contents that are overhauled and supplanted 
from one author and epoch to the next is, as we all know, a shift 
of attention toward the distribution of knowledge at a given time, 
toward the political or social mechanisms of its verification, 
toward the medial and experimental preconditions of cognition 
(Erkenntnis), and even toward the “poetology” of knowledge, 
which—to quote Joseph Vogl’s programmatic text—“immediately 
connects the production of statements and objects of knowledge 
with the question of staging and representability” (1999, 7). 
On the one hand, these theoretical premises necessitate that 
something else must play an equal role, namely the inverse 
of whatever happens to be regarded as true and conducive 
to knowledge at a particular time and for particular “styles of 
thinking.” Any exposure of an “order of discourse” must also take 
into account the negative of this order; that is, it has to account 
for what has fallen through cracks or has been discarded as 
obsolete, faulty, dangerous, or insufficiently validated knowledge. 
(To this extent, non-knowledge has always been a component of 
every discourse-analytical approach to historiography.) On the 
other hand, the most productive research approaches attempt to 
convert this epistemological object itself into something positive, 
productive, and operational. At issue here is not “ignorance”—
that is, I am not concerned with that which, being in clear 
opposition to the known, would thus be false and correctable. 
The issue is rather a fundamental gap or lacuna, a category 
that—beyond the mere negative—casts doubt on the validity 
of the oppositions between true and false, representable and 
unrepresentable, and thereby generates specific epistemological 
effects. “How societies manage their non-knowledge,” in the 
words of Albrecht Koschorke, “is certainly one of the most difficult 
questions of cultural theory” (1999, 445).
It is possible to illustrate this thesis with three short exam-
ples: first, of course, with the category of the “secret,” which 
28 Georg Simmel long ago praised as the “greatest achievement of 
mankind” and thus firmly secures the “foundation of the social” 
in the mode of non-knowledge, both within small groups as well 
as between nations. The manner in which institutions function—
and not only secret societies and intelligence services—is based 
on intransparency. Among both the proponents and critics of 
digital culture, however, the secret has a bad reputation. The 
chief guideline or category is now “transparency,” and this is just 
as apparent in Mark Zuckerberg’s pleas for the necessity of global 
communication as it is in the dissident concept of the “leak,” that 
is, in the unreserved puncturing and exposure of intransparent 
structures, as demanded by Julian Assange or the European 
Pirate Parties. These seemingly incongruous ideologies coincide 
in their absolute trust in the enlightening effects of knowledge 
and cognition. For both positions, the social significance of the 
secret is negligible. Regarding where things might lead, however, 
if the digital world’s transparency becomes reality, David Eggers 
recently offered speculations in his dystopian novel The Circle. In 
his story, the complete openness and transparency of relations 
dissolve into a totalitarian system, and social terror ensues.
Second, it can be said that even the normative foundations 
of society are stabilized by non-knowledge. This can be dem-
onstrated by the concept of the “dark or hidden figure of crime,” 
about which the sociologist Heinrich Popitz wrote a magnificent 
study almost 50 years ago. In order for a state to maintain the 
“validity of its norms,” according to Popitz, it is necessary for it not 
to reveal each of their violations and thus not to punish each of 
their violators. This would be possible from neither an admin-
istrative point of view, because the “sanctioning organization” 
would be overstrained, nor from a moral point of view, because 
the mass of delinquents would dull society’s general readiness to 
be sanctioned, causing the social norms to lose their “protective 
function” (Popitz 1968, 16 and 18). From this argument, Popitz 
derived the idea that a “dark figure” is necessary for a social 
system to function. It is this hidden figure that, as he wrote, 
29provides “relief from the rigidity and overtaxing nature of the 
norm by limiting information about behavior.” The category of 
the “dark figure,” he concluded, “opens up a sphere in which 
the system of norms and sanctions does not need to be strictly 
heeded and yet does not obviously forfeit its claim of validity. … It 
enables … a blurry relation to exist in social life.” (Popitz 1968, 12)
Popitz introduced the category of strategic non-knowledge as 
an antidote to the threat of a “transparent society” (1968, 9). 
Regarding both Schlegel’s remarks and a novel such as The Circle, 
it is telling that Popitz immediately associated the possibility of 
escaping from the horrific vision of total profiling with the pos-
sibility of literary narration. “There will always be,” he wrote, “new 
opportunities to evade the interests of information. Even Orwell 
could write about his utopia of perfect behavioral information in 
the form of a novel: the story that he tells can only get underway 
because the perfection—despite all of the installed surveillance 
equipment—is not achieved. It is still possible in his story for 
certain things to be done ‘in secret.’” (Popitz 1968, 9) 
A third and final example involves a certain caesura in our his-
torical knowledge about human beings, a sort of turning point 
whose questions and consequences warrant further discussion 
as we find ourselves today on the threshold of digital culture. 
The turning point in question was the advent of numerical sta-
tistics around the year 1800. As Wolfgang Schäffner has noted, 
it marked a transition from knowledge to “data knowledge” 
that “formulated epistemological questions no longer on the 
basis of human capacities such as reason, understanding, or 
memory but rather on the basis of a specific materiality, … 
such as that which appears in the problem of transmitting and 
storing masses of data” (1999, 124). Long into the nineteenth 
century, an epistemological ambition persisted that hoped 
to make the knowledge of a nation seem complete and trans-
parent—in the form of tableaus, for instance. At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, however, the excess of data, which, 
as Schäffner notes, “exceeded the domain of the productive 
30 subject” (1999, 123), required a different method—a displacement 
of descriptive statistics in favor of numerical statistics, which 
transformed non-knowledge “into an operable space.” Instead of 
a “complete dissemination of all data” there now appeared the 
“operationalization of the absent” by means of “samples,” “large-
scale calculations,” or “averages” (Schäffner 1999, 123). Thus, 
to summarize these three brief case studies, non-knowledge 
became a precondition of the social, a precondition of the 
narrative, and a precondition of knowledge itself.
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The organization of knowledge in our present day—based as it 
is on “Internet protocols,” “algorithms,” or “Big Data” (and these 
terms remain puzzling however often they might be cited)—poses 
these very same questions with a new level of intensity. Where, 
in our digital culture, can the lines be drawn between knowledge 
and non-knowledge, between transparency and intransparency, 
and between predictability and incommensurability? Ubiquitous 
networking has generated a new and entirely unprecedented 
excess of available knowledge. Interruption, unfamiliarity, and 
distance—three of the constitutive conditions of narration—have 
more or less been eliminated by digital currents of rationalization 
and data collection. This rationalization also concerns certain 
fundamental features of our collective imagination—including, 
for instance, the cultural and social conceptions of love and how 
to find someone to share it with.
As sociologist Eva Illouz has recently demonstrated with a wealth 
of evidence, online dating, at least in Western societies, has 
become the predominate way for single or promiscuous people to 
find a romantic partner. The agencies behind all of this advertise 
that they are able to predict the likelihood of successful amorous 
relationships: those who leave enough information about 
themselves and their wishes in the profiles and multiple-choice 
questionnaires—or so the promise goes—have the strongest 
31chance of meeting the right person. “Love is not a coincidence” 
reads the seemingly ubiquitous slogan of elitepartner.de. Of 
course, this assertion vehemently contradicts the “romantic 
code”—to use Luhmannian terms—that has organized the 
meeting of couples and the synthesis of love and marriage over 
the past 250 years.
The fact that this code is based on contingency and non-
knowledge was made clear by Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel in 
a section of his Aesthetics entitled, appropriately enough, “Love’s 
Contingency.” Unlike the “objective content of existence, with 
one’s family, political aims, nation, and professional obligations,” 
the romantic feeling is entirely left to the person in love, and 
the question of “why it is just this man or this individual woman 
alone is grounded in the person’s own private character, in the 
contingency of caprice” (Hegel 1973, 567). Conversely, Hegel says, 
the suffering experienced in pursuit of love, the false selection 
of a love interest, or a lack of reciprocation cannot be considered 
an “injustice in itself” and a “universal interest.” This is because, 
he notes, “there is nothing inherently necessary in his taking a 
fancy for this girl alone” (Hegel 1973, 568). The idea of romantic 
love depends on the unpredictability and irrationality of the 
encounter, on the fact that, in the eternal stream of passers-by 
and fleeting faces, a particular figure could suddenly appear, 
like the “flash of lightning” in Baudelaire’s famous poem, and 
give new meaning to one’s life. In the world of online dating, this 
fateful moment is replaced by accurate calculations of data, by 
the mathematically supported work of “matching.” At the large 
dating agencies, potential “hits” and “pairings” are generated less 
by the individual profile searches made by clients than they are 
by computer programs, which, on the basis of a person’s data and 
browsing history, are presumably better than the person in ques-
tion at boiling down his or her own tastes and preferences.
With the rise of online dating, it seems as though the history 
of romantic relationships has entered into a new epoch. As is 
well known, the era of marriages being determined on social, 
32 religious, and economic grounds lasted until the end of the eight-
eenth century. The prevailing notion of romance since then—
namely the idea that even family-sanctioned partnerships should 
be based solely on the passionate feelings of two people—seems 
to be gradually eroding with the collective trust that we are 
placing in online dating. Search engines and algorithms have 
become new external authorities for making decisions about the 
suitability of potential romantic partners. Today it is no longer 
parents and families that determine which couples should be 
together; instead, it is the programmers and psychologists 
employed by dating agencies. In the twenty-first century, the 
arranged marriage is experiencing an unexpected comeback. No 
longer occasioned by finances, status, or faith, today’s arranged 
marriages are made only if the data situation is favorable.
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Digital technology provides us with abundant and omnipresent 
data that seem to be eliminating all non-knowledge. Every social 
gathering and every walk in the park now takes place in a fully 
equipped library, and the emblem of our time seems to be a 
table at which everyone is turning to a phone or tablet in order to 
answer or solve, by pushing a few buttons on a screen, whatever 
questions or problems might have arisen. In conversations, one 
occasionally still hears the term “walking encyclopedia” applied 
to people who, when asked, seem to know something about 
the most esoteric areas of knowledge. Yet this term has now 
become applicable to every person with a smartphone at his or 
her disposal; in fact, it doesn’t even make sense anymore as a 
compliment. Moreover, the computer-controlled collection and 
classification of large amounts of data not only has access to the 
past and the present; it also, as we hear so often on the news, is 
used as a method for making allegedly precise predictions about 
such things as future criminal activity or consumer behavior in 
particular regions of the country.
33Algorithms and Big Data are today’s instruments of knowledge—
and yet the ambivalence of digitally construed organizations 
of knowledge lies in the fact that, while their effects—their 
arrangements and distributions—are visible to all of us, the 
specific manner in which they function remains opaque. The 
ontology of algorithms—of that set of instructions which 
determines the series of Google hits, the composition of a 
Facebook timeline, or the matches of a dating agency—is a secret 
known perhaps to just a few corporate programmers. Or perhaps 
it is not even known to them, given that complex and proliferating 
computer codes are not exactly represented in a specific way and 
that some of them can only be viewed by the initiated at a single 
location, much like the well-guarded secret of Coca-Cola’s original 
recipe.
It would thus seem to be high time for the so-called digital 
humanities, which have emerged at our universities over the past 
few years, to start reflecting on a poetology of digital knowledge. 
A perspective of this sort has not received sufficient attention 
from those involved in this area of study. The avant-garde’s often 
blind optimism about knowledge, and the general historical 
forgetfulness of projects being undertaken in the humanities 
and social sciences—which rely precisely on “data mining” and 
computer-generated quantitative processes—are truly quite 
striking. In practically all of the articles that have been pub-
lished in the past years on the use of Big Data, the aim of the 
methodology is claimed to be the recognition of “patterns.” From 
numerous examples, I quote Lev Manovich—certainly one of the 
more original thinkers in this regard—who in one of his essays 
concludes that the “computer-assisted examination of massive 
cultural data sets typically reveals new patterns in this data 
which even [the] best manual ‘close reading’ would miss” (2011, 
9). In terms of the history of theory, it seems as though epis-
temology has regressed by 50 years, back to when Derrida was 
writing his notorious article about Lévi-Strauss and reproaching 
structuralism for deploying a sort of metaphysics of the concept 
34 of structure which simply shifted that reference, which was 
presumably at the heart of the entire structuralist enterprise, 
onto a transcendental signified. Perhaps something similar might 
apply, for example, to the curves, diagrams, and schemata that 
are generated when Google’s Ngram Viewer is used to chart the 
frequency of certain words or phrases in tens of thousands of 
digitalized novels.
As regards the issue of non-knowledge, however, I am more 
interested in a different aspect of the digital humanities, namely 
in the breach or discontinuity that exists between the visu-
alizable effects of computer-assisted organizations of knowledge 
and their codes—the 30-year-old mathematical origins of a 
programming language that end users have never had to learn, at 
least not since the first Macintosh computers and their intuitive 
interface made coding skills unnecessary. The basic question is 
this: How can algorithms be represented? Thinking about search 
engines some ten years ago, Peter Haber diagnosed the per-
manent neglect of any genealogy of knowledge. It is a question 
that has been addressed more recently by the media philosopher 
Alexander Galloway: drawing a maybe precarious and assailable 
distinction, he divides digitally processed knowledge into raw 
numerical “data” and into “information” that can be represented 
in writing, images, or videos (it remains doubtful, of course, 
whether something like “raw data” actually exists). I believe that 
this distinction is productive, however, because Galloway is able 
to use it to isolate the rift that exists between mathematically 
calculated and visualized knowledge. With reference to Gilles 
Deleuze’s famous little essay, he notes: “Adequate visualizations 
of control society have not happened” (Galloway 2011, 91, emphasis 
original).
It is possible to analyze, for instance, the representation of 
Edward Snowden’s betrayal of secrets, as has been attempted 
in newspaper reports and in the impressive film Citizenfour, 
precisely in terms of the representivity or non-representivity of 
digitally mediated masses of data. Glenn Greenwald and Laura 
35Poitras’ encounter with Snowden in a hotel room in Hong Kong 
is riveting; having watched the film, you would be able to say 
something about the relationship between victimhood and whis-
tleblowing or about the life-changing boldness of Snowden’s 
act, but you would be at pains to identify any details about the 
bold nature of the content that Snowden had brought to light. 
The film offers no specific image of this excess of abstract and 
encoded data. In Citizenfour, Poitras repeatedly depicts the 
decoded greetings from the beginnings of Snowden’s email 
correspondence, but then as soon as we expect to see something 
decisive, she cuts away from the scene. And so today, when it is 
so often said that the collective outrage in the wake of these rev-
elations has been somewhat restrained, the main reason for this 
restraint is presumably related to the problem of representation.
To revisit Galloway’s thoughts for a final time, the algorithm is 
an authority, but its calculus, its governmental principles—its 
“algorithmic governmentality,” as Antoinette Rouvroy recently 
called it—remain in the dark. For most members of the Internet 
society, from its indifferent consumers to its political activists, 
the world of the digital represents a space of transparency, par-
ticipation, and freedom—the most modern manifestation of 
modernity’s achievements. But those examining the relationship 
between knowledge and non-knowledge that this space produces 
more closely could also come to the conclusion that the 250-year-
old elements of the bourgeois public sphere no longer have much 
to do with the way in which digital culture functions. Such is the 
remarkable thesis of the article by Claus Pias and Timon Beyes 
published in this volume on “Transparency and Secrecy.” 
If a characteristic of modern organizations of knowledge and 
society is that they have replaced both the secretive, arbitrary 
rule of the absolute sovereign and providential notions of the 
future with concepts of openness, contingency, and participation, 
then the premodern world and our digital culture do in fact have 
a number of things in common. Algorithms create providence: on 
Amazon and Netflix, they tell us which books or television series 
36 might appeal to us after we have made a single purchase; they 
suggest friends to us on social networks; they select potential 
marriage partners while the self-empowerment of the romantic 
and subjective selection of partners, which had been determining 
the course of love since the last third of the eighteenth century, 
slowly fades into oblivion. 
An analysis of non-knowledge, however, is not at all intended to 
leave an aftertaste of irrationality. Rather, it should make a con-
tribution to the analysis of power structures in the digital age. 
As Galloway has written: “The point of unrepresentability is the 
point of power. And the point of power today is not the image. 
The point of power today resides in networks, computers, infor-
mation, and data” (2011, 92). 
As authorities over knowledge, the most powerful actors in this 
sphere are entirely aware of the ancient and grand tradition to 
which they belong. So much is clear, for instance, in the sovereign 
playfulness with which they have named themselves. After all, 
the second o in the acronym Yahoo, the first mainstream web 
portal in the history of the Internet, stands for the word oracle.
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WikiLeaks, the Snowden affair, and secret service 
hacks have brought the notion of the secret, long 
sidelined by a morally charged discourse on digital 
transparency, to the forefront of the world’s 
attention. Correspondingly, in this chapter we 
conceptualize digital cultures not—or at least not 
primarily—in terms of the nature and potential 
of transparency (or of related concepts such as 
participation and the public sphere). Instead, 
we suggest thinking about them in terms of the 
secret, in terms of fundamental intransparency 
and non-knowledge, and in terms of the arcane. 
How would digital cultures be understood if we set 
aside modern concepts and instead examine them 
through the strangeness of premodern concepts 
like the arcane?
  PARTICIPATION  
40 If it is true that transparency represents one of today’s most 
prominent concepts, then digitalization can be said to designate 
the media-technological condition of its ubiquity. As Manfred 
Schneider has pointed out, during the last 20 years or so a 
“messianic potential” has consolidated in the ideal and ideology 
of transparency (Schneider 2013, 13). This corresponds approx-
imately to the span of time in which forms of digital world-making 
have prevailed, forms whose technological basis has come to 
characterize the systems and processes of communication, 
perception, and the bestowal of meaning (Sinngebung) (Striphas 
2015). This development has made it clear that we have to speak 
of digital cultures in the plural, if only because the heterogeneity 
of this socio-technical arrangement seems to correspond to 
various forms of world-making that have arisen in tandem with 
the digital media environment that now pervades our lifeworld.1 
In opposition to the messianism of transparent and secret-free 
spheres of, say, politics and business, which derives its energy 
from the Internet’s fiber-optic cables and the omnipresence 
of intelligent artifacts that can, in part, communicate with one 
another without the intervention of human subjects, there 
stands the nightmare of a “transparency society,” in which the 
exposed lives of individuals become “big data” in the hands 
of Internet companies and government intelligence agencies 
that, while remaining intransparent themselves, collect and 
evaluate the traces left behind by digital users (Han 2015; Pas-
quale 2015). Activists, in turn, have been experimenting with 
media-technically enabled tactics of intransparency and secrecy 
in order to make it possible for user-based representations of 
identity to escape into anonymity or into subject positions that 
are fluctuating and temporary (the group known as “Anonymous” 
has thus far been the most captivating example of this; see 
Coleman 2015). The whole affair with Edward Snowden and the 
1 Parts of this chapter are taken in revised form from the forthcoming “The 
Media Arcane.” A prior version of the text was first published in German in 
Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften 2014 (2): 111–117.
41US National Security Agency (NSA), moreover, has certainly con-
firmed Schneider’s laconic dictum: “In the here and now, there is 
no transparency” (Schneider 2013, 14).
At the same time, Snowden’s betrayal of secrets has brought 
the very concept of the secret, so long sidelined by the morally 
charged discourse in favor of digital transparency, to the fore-
front of our attention. Our contribution to this debate is devoted 
to conceptualizing digital cultures not—or at least not primarily—
in terms of the problematic nature and potential of transparency 
(or of related concepts such as participation and the public 
sphere) but rather to thinking about them in terms of the secret, 
in terms of fundamental intransparency, and in terms of the 
arcane.1 Our first step will thus be to (re)call to mind the general 
social form—at least beyond its commonly understood ethical 
dubiousness—of the secret and its functionality; this will allow 
us to shed a more sobering light on secrecy and its betrayal. We 
would then like to venture an experimental-historical approach in 
greater detail, which will enable us to reexamine, with reference 
to premodern types of secrets, the present state of digital 
cultures on the basis of their temporal structures. There are thus 
two sides to our suggested approach: On the one hand, it is con-
cerned with the question of how digital cultures can be concep-
tualized in terms of the secret; on the other hand, however, it is 
also concerned with whether our present concepts of the secret 
are even appropriate for or conducive to this type of thinking.
For reflecting on the social form of the secret, Georg Simmel’s 
meandering essay on “the secret and secret society” marks an 
invaluable point of departure. Independent of their contents or 
the value attributed to them, Simmel considered “the attractions 
1 Based on a similar argument, Howard Caygill recently suggested turning 
to the notions of secrecy and the arcane for rethinking the relation-
ship between state and civil society: “Any radical politics founded in the 
emergent global civil society empowered by but also dependent on digital 
technology has to confront the problem of the arcana of state and civil 
society …” (2015, 38; original emphasis).
42 of secrecy” to be a necessary aspect for differentiating social 
relations; secrecy’s attractions are enabled by differentiation as 
much as they intensify them (1999, 409). The secret, “or the con-
cealment of realities through negative or positive means, is one of 
mankind’s greatest achievements. Unlike the childish condition in 
which every idea is given immediate expression and every activity 
is put on display for everyone, the secret leads to an immense 
enhancement of life, and this is because so many of life’s contents 
cannot even emerge in circumstances of complete publicity” 
(Simmel 1999, 406). To write the history of secrecy is thus one way 
of tracing the development of society: a sequence of revealed 
things that have become secret and of secret things that have 
been revealed. This yields a sort of zero-sum game of incoming 
and outgoing contents that are worthy of confidentiality, of 
secrecy and revelation, covertness and betrayal, with the secret 
functioning as the mysterious operator of social evolution.
In light of today’s digital cultures, however, it is reasonable to 
call into question Simmel’s concluding speculation that the 
“activities of the general public will become ever more open as 
those of individuals become more secretive” (1999, 411). Is the 
self-exposure of digital users on the Internet not indicative of 
the porous nature of the distinction between the public and 
the private, and does the discovery of secret masses of data by 
WikiLeaks and Snowden—their publication aside—not prove 
the existence of an enormous apparatus of secrecy? That said, 
Simmel’s basic idea still seems rather fruitful to us, namely that 
the secret deserves to be taken seriously as a fundamental cat-
egory of cultural analysis. What is needed is a historical inves-
tigation of various forms of secrecy in order to gain insight into its 
present-day varieties (Assmann and Assmann 1997–1999). From a 
historical perspective, moreover, it will be shown that the secret 
ought to be thought about somewhat differently: The question 
is not what is being kept secret but what is able to be betrayed 
and what—in light of this ability or inability to be an object of 
43betrayal—constitutes the significance and the logic of the secret 
in various cultures and at various times (Horn 2013). 
In this sense, we would like to propose a thought experiment, 
and it is to think about digital cultures beyond any concept of 
modernity according to which digital cultures are themselves 
modernity’s final product, and have possibly even brought an end 
to the very modernity in question (Lyotard 1984). Many of today’s 
passionate debates, it seems, have illustrated this issue by means 
of a latent anachronism that finds expression through the use of 
established concepts such as transparency, the public sphere, 
and participation (Baxmann et al. 2016). To intensify and take this 
anachronism further: How would digital cultures be understood 
if we set aside modern concepts (and ever-derivative postmodern 
concepts) and instead examined them through the strangeness 
of premodern concepts? For at that time the secret possessed 
an altogether different and, at least for our purposes, potentially 
fruitful historical semantics.
Up until the seventeenth century, cosmology drew a line 
around an essentially secretive realm, a line that demarcated 
a fundamental unknown in the form of natural secrets. It was 
modern science that first raised an objection to such secrets, 
namely with the goal of gaining knowledge about nature with 
natural means and of removing all authority from the “cosmic-
religious stop sign” (Luhmann and Fuchs 1989, 104). Using the 
language of systems theory, we might say that time yielded the 
possibility of de-paradoxing natural secrets. In a comparable 
manner, however, “high” matters of state were regarded, on the 
basis of their nature, as secretive. Here the resolutions, decisions, 
and deeds enacted by the lords of wisdom were thought to pos-
sess a secret and essentially unfathomable intelligence, without 
which the stability of the state could not be preserved. The res-
olutions, decisions, and deeds themselves were clear for all to 
see, but the reasons behind them could not be betrayed and thus 
could also not be discussed. In cosmological terms, they were as 
incommunicable as all the great matters of nature and therefore 
44 they represented not only wisdom, the arbitrary nature of which 
“has to be protected from triviality and thus kept secret” (Luh-
mann and Fuchs 1989, 116), but also a structurally unbetrayable 
secret. 
In this context, the treatment of the secret then was probably 
more differentiated than it is today (or in Simmel’s sketch of 
things), and this is because premodernity was familiar with 
various types of secrets—such as the arcana cordis, the arcana 
dei, the arcana mundi, or the arcana imperii—each of which 
obeyed different concepts, methods, and rationalities. As far as 
our argument is concerned, however, the primary distinction to 
keep in mind is that between the mysterium (something non-
knowable and thus non-betrayable) and the secretum (something 
concealed that can be made intelligible and thus be betrayed). 
The arcana imperii thus incorporate both aspects: the mysterium 
of the ruler’s wisdom and caprice as the center of an unbetray-
able reasoning and, at the same time, a bustling multiplicity of 
minor or major secreta that are the object of betrayal and of 
efforts to keep them secret from all sorts of “intelligence” (lit-
erally, that is, from essentially possible forms of insight).
In contrast to this, the debates held today among politicians 
and in the newspapers concerning data protection and privacy 
rights operate with a different—and from our perspective rather 
reductive—variety of secrets, namely with those that can be 
betrayed. As soon as the shift is made into this modern category, 
a secret can either be betrayed or not betrayed, revealed or kept 
confidential. Without this hegemony of a particular type of secret, 
the idea of transparency associated with the so-called bourgeois 
public sphere could never have been formulated. It is the type 
of secret that can and must be revealed, and it simultaneously 
creates a situation in which it is unclear whether the state should 
fear its citizens or vice versa. With this newfound suspicion of 
sovereignty, along with an active interest in de-masking arcana, 
the type of secret that is unbetrayable seems either to have been 
lost or relocated to another realm.
45As Reinhart Koselleck has shown, the unbetrayable secret has 
been sublimated into a new temporal order (2004). To some 
extent, modernity has transferred the unbetrayable secret of 
sovereignty onto time itself. It is the future that has henceforth 
become a secret that cannot be betrayed. Moreover, modernity 
has firmly associated the question of the future with the notion 
of participation and the public sphere. Both are embedded in a 
context of secrecy and transparency that are oriented toward the 
future. Otherwise participation—according to our modern under-
standing of it—would be meaningless, because it takes place 
between what is and what ought to be: between how the world 
is and how it (otherwise) could be. In this sense, as is well known, 
the eighteenth century invented a new form of historicity and 
thus a new form of history itself. And it came to treat the present 
as the decisive place between the “space of experience” and the 
“horizon of expectation” (Koselleck 2004, 255–275), as the venue 
of an essentially open future.
As regards digital cultures, the thesis that we would like to 
advance is that a new temporal order has been established—a 
“chronotope” that is distinct from the temporal order that 
established itself between 1780 and 1830 and has since defined 
our thinking. We believe that the beginnings of this change can 
be traced back to the rise of modern cybernetics after 1945. 
As Norbert Wiener suspected as early as 1948, the advent of 
digital computers—along with concepts such as feedback, self-
regulating systems, and prediction—initiated a fundamental 
rearrangement of temporal structures (1961, 60–94). With the 
digitalization of further aspects of our lifeworld and with the 
countless number of apparatuses that can communicate with 
one another independently and can—the largest and smallest 
alike—control one another mutually and provide feedback to 
one another, these particularly cybernetic temporal relations 
have more or less become absolute. Arguably, they engender 
an order of time in which modern historicity collapses. One 
could perhaps call this an “absolutism of the present” (to adapt a 
46 phrase by Robert Musil), or, in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s terms, it 
could be referred to as a “broad present” (2014). The cybernetic 
chronotope of digital cultures thus raises, yet again, as a topic of 
discussion the question of historical temporalities.
This diagnosis is not new. A quarter of a century ago, for instance, 
Vilém Flusser offered a similar interpretation (1991). If, according 
to Flusser, a bond exists between cybernetic machines that 
interconnect by means of feedback, that behave adaptively, that 
process interferences independently, and that allow, by means 
of what today is called big data, the data traces of subjects to be 
conflated with the prediction of forms of subjectivation—then 
the relation between what is and what ought to be collapses 
and thus, with it, the modern concept of the future. Like other 
thinkers before and after him, Flusser referred to this con-
dition as “post-history.” For logical reasons, according to his 
diagnosis, there can no longer be any conventionally under-
stood arguments, critiques, or politics within this new temporal 
order. And thus participation, as Flusser quite radically infers, is 
“nonsense.”2 In contrast to this bleak outlook, we would like to 
propose an experimental-historical approach, and this is to think 
about today’s digital cultures precisely not in terms of modern 
concepts but rather—at least tentatively—in terms of premodern 
concepts. For if the modern temporal order has in fact become 
problematic or has even collapsed entirely, the challenge would 
then consist of no longer conceptualizing digital cultures with the 
categories of transparency, participation, and the public sphere 
but rather in terms of a fundamental intransparency—in terms, 
that is, of the arcane.
If the origin of this new temporal order can be ascribed to 
the cybernetic concepts of feedback, self-regulating systems, 
2 In what follows, Flusser then elaborates that figures such as functionaries, 
depressed people, terrorists, technocrats, and environmental activists are 
social types that are specific to a present in which participation has become 
logically impossible.
47prediction, and digital computers, then we can state at the 
same time that digital and networked media are the agents of 
this chronotope. The everyday examples are countless: Entire 
industries have since arisen that are concerned with predicting 
such things as what type of music we like to listen to, which tele-
vision series we like to watch, who we should really be friends 
with, or how we can best avoid traffic on our way to work. With 
greater and greater masses of data, it is becoming increasingly 
probable to predict even the seemingly unpredictable twists and 
turns of the subject—something like anticipating the evasive, 
zig-zag maneuvers of an enemy airplane. It is no longer possible 
to escape from ourselves; rather, we are incessantly confronted 
with ourselves and with our own surprising predictability. Being 
deprived of the future in such ways—this blending of the “space 
of experience” and the “horizon of expectation” into a media-
technical feedback loop between the past and the future—can 
perhaps better be understood with premodern concepts of time. 
Consequently, the thesis can also be advanced that the “like” 
culture of so-called social media has less to do with modern 
participation than it does with premodern rituals. “Likes” seem 
to resemble instead the états, cortes, or parliaments that were 
common from the late Middle Ages until the eighteenth century. 
Such forms of “participation,” to which modernity had put an 
end, were rituals of consensus and not negotiations of dissent. It 
was just such rituals, in fact, that modernity disavowed as the 
opposite of the political. They operated according to a sort of 
logic that has nothing to do with a participatory public sphere 
based on arguments and transparency. They were necessary and 
performative forms of participation within a non-future-oriented 
temporal order because they lacked the concept of decision-
making itself (Krischer 2010).
These examples, to which many more could be added, raise 
the question of how much one can and must know about the 
“apparatuses” (in Flusser’s terms) that create the particular 
temporality of digital cultures, the question of which secrets they 
48 might possess that perhaps ought to be made transparent, and 
the paradoxical question of which secrets they are hiding that are 
unbetrayable or should perhaps remain protected. To this extent, 
our attempt at interpretation will either stand or fall depending 
on the issue of the “understanding” of digital media. And this 
“media-understanding,” as Friedrich Kittler surmised some 
30 years ago, is perhaps a melancholy enterprise. His famous 
pronouncement that media “determine our situation” was 
made at a moment in which, in light of the emergence of digital 
cultures, the limitations or the impossibility of our ability to 
understand them were already beginning to loom. Or in Kittler’s 
own words: “The general digitization … erases the differences 
among individual media. … [A] total media link on a digital base 
will erase the very concept of medium. Instead of wiring people 
and technologies, absolute knowledge will run as an endless 
loop” (Kittler 1999, 1–2).
Since then, the plea for new types of representation, and even for 
a new poetics of rendering intelligible network-based governance 
and control (Galloway 2011), can thus be understood as an effort 
to oppose the intransparency, unrepresentability, and incom-
mensurability of algorithms with a different “understanding” of 
digital media and to respond to the absolutism of the present 
with new images and forms of thinking that go beyond the mere 
betrayal of secreta (à la Snowden) and do greater justice to the 
mysterium of a media-technically conditioned arcanum. Espe-
cially at stake here is the related issue of action, and the basis 
for action if this is to take place in a chronotope that, to re-quote 
Flusser, is no longer determined by transparency, capable of 
deliberative reasoning, or open to the future. The discourse 
about transparency, which is always making or reflecting an 
ethical claim, has reached the limits of a secret that is challenging 
us to conceptualize an ethics without transparency and a future 
without the modern understanding of participation and the 
public sphere (Latour 2003; Foerster 2003).
49A look at climatology is especially striking in this context, for 
hardly any other domain of knowledge is epistemologically so 
dependent on the historical state of hardware and software, 
on the observable leaps in quality enabled by sheer computing 
power but also on a history of software in whose millions of 
lines of poorly documented or undocumented code have sed-
imented archaeological layers of scientific thinking that, for good 
reason, cannot be touched or rewritten but merely expanded 
and globally standardized and certified. That which is processed 
in the supercomputers of such a global research alliance can 
simply no longer be made transparent—not even to the scientists 
involved. It follows that the habitual routines of critique are at 
a loss to address the kind of alternative worlds (and not merely 
prognoses) that result, and what might guide our behavior and 
self-perception under these conditions. The common reflex of 
citing the “constructedness” of knowledge achieves little in this 
regard, for it does not absolve anyone from acting in the face of 
scenarios that are conscious of their own constructivism. And the 
falsifiability of classical scientific ethics (not merely for reasons of 
capacity but for systematic reasons as well) is not practicable in 
this case because it is impossible to experiment with the climate 
as an object of science.
Accordingly, some climate scientists have begun to call for a new 
cosmology in order to justify our future activity on a global level. 
Should this demand be extended to all possible fields in which 
the degree of networking, computer power, and software devel-
opment has achieved a measure of complexity at which under-
standing and comprehension are impossible—to such fields that, 
nevertheless, create a feedback loop between the present and 
the future? If, as in this example, the political becomes entwined 
around a center of non-knowledge and non-understanding, a 
modern transparency concept of knowledge reaches its limits, as 
does the idea of participation by means of voicing one’s opinion 
about “the matter at hand” (Schelsky 1965). And even this can 
be expressed, with recourse to thinking about the secret, in 
50 premodern terms: The legitimation strategy of the computer-
simulated climate cosmology corresponds to the premodern 
political register of sovereignty. Climate research, as it were, 
has become a new science royale. In the place once occupied 
by the wisdom (or caprice) of the ruler—a place protected by a 
metaphysical limit to knowledge—there is now the sovereignty of 
data processing. The sovereignty of data processing has drawn 
a new line to demarcate that which is constitutively evasive on 
account of being secretive according to its “nature.” Only it is no 
longer nature and no longer cosmology, but rather technology. 
Previously, and with respect to sovereign rule, this was referred 
to as the arcane.
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Martina Leeker
Non-knowledge and incomprehensibility are, for 
now, the norm in digital cultures. These states, 
produced part technologically, part discursively, 
need particular attention because they form a 
“politics of non-knowledge.” Against this back-
drop, critique is necessary but is at the same 
time difficult to execute because the possibility 
of gaining knowledge is fundamentally put into 
question. A performing “practice of critique,” 
which tests the contemporary theorization on 
digital cultures by reflecting it with exaggerated 
affirmation and identification, is recommended as 
a method of critique in digital cultures. Its aim is 
to enable a self-awareness of digital cultures con-
cerning the politics of non-knowledge.
54 Introduction 
Digital cultures are characterized, it could be argued, by a variety 
of forms and levels of non-knowledge1 and incomprehensibility.2,3 
They arise from the technological conditions of digital cultures, 
about which no one is fully informed, as e.g., unrepresentable 
algorithms (Galloway 2011) or untestable simulations (Vehlken 
2016). Against this background, Timon Beyes and Claus Pias 
(2014) have proclaimed a culture of non-knowledge and incom-
prehensibility in digital cultures. That is, they are the norm 
and demand different forms of participation and policy than 
e.g., transparency, which is claimed in the dispute over data 
surveillance. In digital cultures, incomprehensibility and non-
knowledge are, it could be said, no longer a shortcoming or an 
exceptional situation that must be rectified. Rather, they are 
becoming the status quo, and as such are extremely productive 
1 Knowledge refers to Michael Foucault ’s order of knowledge (episteme) 
in a historical phase and is inseparable from power (Foucault 1994). 
Non-knowledge is thereby productive in the sense that through interplay 
with power, new forms of knowledge can be initiated. An example would 
be disciplinary actions with which new knowledge for classifying and 
treating individuals can be created (Foucault 1994). In digital cultures, non-
knowledge becomes a new episteme, thus building new knowledge forms.
2 It is possible to know something without understanding it. Understanding 
then refers first to an operationalization of knowledge regulated by com-
munication and action. Secondly, of interest here, “understanding” refers to 
the tradition of hermeneutics, organizing the capabilities of cognition and 
giving sense. This brings to the fore either subjects and deep psychological 
explanation models, or a machinic understanding that processes data 
beyond subjects and intentions. Niklas Luhmann’s (2001) hermeneutic 
model, too, requires no subject as it creates understanding as a function 
of systems over couplings. For Derrida, understanding and hermeneutics 
are ultimately a problem because they fix definitions and thereby exclude 
“other” (Derrida and Gadamer 2004). (For the history of hermeneutics in 
consideration of digital cultures, see Pias 2015.)
3 Knowledge and understanding, or their impossibility, can be brought 
together under the concept of “knowledge systems,” which includes epis-
temes, epistemology and hermeneutics. 
55since they produce governmentality, generate subjects, and cor-
respond to the epistemological constitution of digital cultures. 
This culture of non-knowledge and incomprehensibility 
requires new forms of critique. Critique, tasked with analysis 
and reflection, is central to the scientific examination of digital 
cultures. Hitherto, to do so was enabled by a presupposed critical 
distance, an external position, and an exposure of knowledge 
that lay hidden in the background. But where on the one hand 
comprehension is supposed to be absent, and when, on the other 
hand, human actors are assumed to be already always entan-
gled in the technological environment (Engemann and Sprenger 
2015b), forms and methods of reflection and critique other 
than the traditional ones based on distance to the socio-cul-
tural surroundings must be devised and tested. A contradictory 
situation emerges in which notions and practices of critique are 
changed under technological conditions and, at the same time, 
have the status of discursive assumptions.4 The aim of this text 
is not to find the correct notion of critique but to understand the 
discursively generated state of the art of critique under the con-
ditions of digital cultures and how to deal with it. 
As a method of dealing with this situation a “practice of critique” 
is proposed and explored here with a practical project. In it, 
technological conditions and discourses on digital cultures 
are embodied and performed. This gives rise to critique and 
reflection produced in an “outside in inside” as a proposal for 
a model of critique in digital cultures. That this practice could 
be successful is due to a specific situation in digital cultures—a 
situation constituted of an inescapable ambivalence in which 
affirmative new descriptions of digital cultures, technological 
4 In this text it is presumed that critique does not exist a priori. On the con-
trary, there are different concepts and practices of critique in different 
techno-historical situations, which should enable reflection and dis-
tanciation. This involves the idea that critique is possible from an outer, 
distant position as well as e.g., the concept of a second-order observation, 
which denies any outer position of critique.
56 procedures, and a politics and economy of affect (Angerer 2007) 
and relations as a discourse of the new solely valid mode of 
existence (see Barad 2003) co-exist. Out of this co-existence a 
“dispositif of technospheres” arises that targets, above all, the 
ensnarement of human actors in technological environments; a 
process for which non-knowledge and incomprehensibility are 
the lifeblood, so to speak. There are, nevertheless, gaps, rup-
tures, and contradictions in the coexistence in which the practice 
of critique can take root. Against this background, the perfor-
mative tests of theories, discourses, and technological conditions 
for digital cultures should enable the exploration of govern-
mental and subject-forming consequences of the dispositif of 
the technospheres, which serve at the same time as the basis for 
other theoretical formations than those of, e.g., non-knowledge 
and incomprehensibility. Finally, methods of “in/forming culture” 
are proposed to open temporary gaps for knowledge and for the 
power to act for human agents.5
What’s going on? Discourse-on-Things, 
Techno-Ecology, Digital Mysterium, Dispositif 
of Technospheres
The current situation of digital discourses on digital cultures can 
be described as a complex farrago. The interplay of technological 
procedures and conditions with the discursive generation of 
digital cultures and economic and political interests form what 
is called here a “dispositif of technospheres.” This dispositif and 
its constitution in, as well as its benefits from, non-knowledge 
and incomprehensibility, are outlined below. A crux is the 
crucial element: non-knowledge and incomprehensibility are 
5 As the notion “actor” still implies the concept of an autonomous and 
intentional subject, which is put into question in digital cultures and their 
“agencies” of different parts, the notion of “human agents” is used to 
indicate a new status of the older anthropocentric view. 
57symptoms of digital cultures, yet also discursive inventions that 
are of use in the facilitation of governmental forms and eco-
nomic regimes in digital cultures. These conditions generate a 
permanent balancing act in the scientific examination that flips 
between critical analysis and discursive generation. To deal with 
this situation, the current discourse landscape of cultural and 
media studies is presented and analyzed.6 This is based on non-
knowledge and incomprehensibility, which are quietly escalating 
to a “regime of non-knowledge.” 
Discourse-on-Things and Techno-Ecology
A powerful discourse field within the emerging “regime of non-
knowledge” is formed from discourse-on-things (Latour and 
Weibel 2005) and techno-ecology (Hörl 2011), as presented by, 
for example, Mark B. Hansen (2011), Erich Hörl (2014) and the 
so-called new materialism (Barad 2003). The departure point is 
a model according to which human agents and technical things 
should no longer be in an instrumental relationship, but instead 
bound in a symmetrical agency. Then, as the technologically 
based insight suggests, the so-called smart things look back at 
human beings and respond to them in a manner that is proactive 
and predictive. Paradigmatic in this discourse from the techno-
ecological perspective are the media-neuro-philosophical 
assumptions of Mark B. Hansen (2011). He is concerned with an 
“environmental media theory,” in which humans are an integral 
part of a large, networked structure of technological forces and 
effects that exists and operates beyond human perception. To 
this belong smart technologies such as e.g., sensors that are 
themselves a sub-organismal sentience. Description and analysis 
of these impels, according to Hansen, humans and subjects 
to be regarded not as autonomous entities, but as parts of an 
enormous cosmic network of pure potentiality of sensations and 
6 In further research the technological conditions of digital cultures should be 
delineated from their technical history (Technikgeschichte).
58 events. Technological environments are seen as a power of acting 
via affecting that can no longer cognitively be grasped or con-
trolled by humans. 
What is now crucial is that these discourses affirm the states of 
impaired comprehension and precarious knowledge, and dignify 
them. Addressing relationships, understood as operators for 
an existential involvement of human agents in technological 
environments, the theories outlined can be seen as a solution 
for dealing with current challenges. This includes, for example, 
the (climate) catastrophes and capitalist crises (Hörl 2014; Latour 
2010 and 2013), proclaimed with the Anthropocene. Considering 
that the discourses on relations correspond to the liquidation of 
an anthropology of autonomous and self-conscious beings, these 
discourses may well be seen as attempts to solve these crises 
by installing an environmental modesty. In addition, in the dis-
course-on-things and in the techno-ecology, a life with the non-
comprehensible as the norm is recognized and celebrated, as 
stated by Bruno Latour: “Once again, our age has become the age 
of wonder at the disorders of nature” (Latour 2010, 481). The being 
in agencies, because the co-existence of non-human and human 
actants is no longer predictable or controllable, should moreover 
correspond to a deliverance from, according to Latour (2008), a 
“false” history of the human-thing relationship that had been in 
force since the eighteenth century. It was based on the fact that 
people saw themselves as independent of their environment 
and capable of knowledge. Finally, the dissolving of knowledge 
in sensing and pre-consciousness, thus in non-knowledge as 
a mode of existence, is ennobled. This process is put forward 
with, to be specific, an undertone of affirmation (Hansen 2011), 
as if a more appropriate picture of human agents would now be 
produced. Non-knowledge and incomprehensibility are produced 
as conditions for the possibility of “better and more accurate” 
descriptions of “human” and “existence,” as well as the savior of 
humanity and the earth. This supercharging is what makes it so 
59difficult to build a critical distance from the techno-ecological 
field of discourse.
Digital Mysterium
From the tradition of media-historically and media-epis-
temologically oriented media studies comes another proposal 
for the new description, which is presented in the example of a 
short essay by Beyes and Pias (2014).7 It deals with an arcana of 
digital cultures constituted of secrets that cannot be revealed 
(un-betrayable secrets).
Pias has proposed the development of a theory of digital cultures 
whose constitution draws from incomprehensibility and secrets 
(2016). The big challenge of digital cultures is, specifically, their 
immanence, since there would no longer be any outside and we 
would be in technology. This constitution would be attended 
by an epistemological rupture. In place of hermeneutics would 
be constitutive incomprehensibility, which could no longer be 
ignored or escaped (Pias 2015). So it is that, for example, due to 
the unfathomable amounts of data being processed, no under-
standing is possible. The programs that process these data are 
no longer completely comprehensible in their functions and 
regularities to programmers or scientists. Networks for data 
transfers in infrastructures (Engemann and Sprenger 2015a) 
cannot be controlled and could never be if they are going 
to function at all. Finally, technical things can work in a self-
organized way without any human intervention. With this comes 
to an end a critical hermeneutics in media studies, which while 
not believing in an understanding in the sense of intrapsychic 
systems and processes in individuals, probably did believe in the 
possibility of seeing media effects and works (McLuhan 1964; 
Kittler 1986). The prerequisite for this “insight” were the codes 
or the moments of technological upheaval being looked at (Pias 
7 See the essay by Beyes and Pias in this volume.
60 2015). This retrospective interpretability is profoundly questioned 
(Beyes and Pias 2014).
Therefore, Beyes and Pias (2014) argue for a theory of the mys-
tery of digital cultures. Unlike betrayable secrets (secreta) the 
mystery denotes its own constitutional ineluctability. Because it 
has its history in the concept of a sovereign ruler or cosmology of 
pre-modern times, which were not meant to be understood, the 
reasons for the conditions or the decisions are not laid bare and 
also could not be made transparent.
As an example of a mystery in digital cultures, Beyes and Pias 
cite climate research (2014), in which the calculations cannot be 
understood but are, nevertheless, determined to be non-exper-
imentally testable predictions of reality. Instead of a mystery in 
the form of a ruler or a cosmology of pre-modern times, there is 
now the secret of data processing. 
Interplay: In the Dispositif of Technospheres
The thesis is that the two discursive formations can be bundled 
into a “dispositif of technospheres.” In it, non-knowing and incom-
prehensibility are affirmed and made productive, or exploited in 
their productivity. Where the theory of techno-ecology brings in 
agencies and technological environments, and a new, weak sense 
of deep-sensory techno-participation (Hörl 2014 and 2016), the 
cultures of secrets deal with the end of participation and come 
up with the subordination of human agents under technological 
regimes. At first glance, the discursive formations therefore 
exclude themselves. A closer inspection, though, reveals that 
both are in agreement on a deprivation of “human” power and an 
inauguration of potent technology. The generator of this change 
is, in both cases, the secret. Techno-ecology deals with the 
secret that comes out of the not recognizing and non-knowing of 
technological spheres. The theory of the digital mysterium has to 
do with the secret of power and the fascination of non-knowing. 
61It is about the sphere of non-visible processes and events, which 
could only be divined.
These new, so-called weak ontologies could be seen as a 
response to the self-induced crises of digital cultures resulting 
from technological conditions and their theoretical descriptions. 
They bring with them to the technospheres the promise of giving 
humans a position, and a form of action-possibility beyond 
knowledge, thinking, and awareness, which come out of the 
extensive “sensing” and the mysterious fanning of the hidden 
power of technology as the new sovereign. In the techno-
ecological, almost animistic, resonance, human agents could 
operate directly in this dispositif, even when no longer con-
trollable. In contrast to this participative sensing, the culture 
of secrets lures human agents with the fascination and glory of 
secrecy. 
The two discursive fields are linked where “sensing” and secrecy 
compensate for the inaccessibility concerning knowledge and 
comprehension, and hallucinate new forms of participation. The 
secret cultures describe thereby, though only in part, the state of 
data politics, in which negotiations and usages of data are done in 
secret. However, in taking descriptions of symptoms as a starting 
point, in a similar way to the techno-ecologies, appointing these 
to the status quo, they run the risk of coagulating into a mode of 
governmentality. Because the digital arcana legitimizes not only 
secret policies—which can only be obeyed and followed, but no 
longer understood, or be actively created by human agents—but 
also the sealing off of technology with the theoretical model of 
non-knowing. If non-knowing is the status quo, then all efforts to 
uncover the secrets within would be in vain. 
The dispositif of technospheres that arises from the different 
discourses thus aims for human agents that are swinging with the 
technological environment and celebrating self-optimization in 
sensing. In doing so, they forget the politics of the technospheres. 
The obedience of this technological being in spheres thereby 
62 arises as the new ritual of the political public in digital cultures of 
mystery. 
Ambivalence: Balancing Act between New Descriptions 
and Politics 
The thesis is that on the one hand, in the developing discourse 
landscape and the dispositif of technospheres, a necessary 
new description of culture in the time of technological self-
organization is being dealt with. On the other hand, it is essential 
to explore the possibilities of theory formation in the context 
of the no longer completely understandable and increasingly 
closed-off technological environments. The problem with this 
dispositif is that the new ontologies simultaneously, as described, 
carry politics within themselves that are necessary to be recog-
nized and reflected. The interest in affects and sensitive materi-
ality comes, e.g., out of the fact that with focusing these aspects, 
more and more dimensions of human agents could be captured 
and formalized. The captured results of these processes are 
then firstly transferred to the data economy, as for profiling, and 
secondly used for the regulation of algorithmically controlled 
processes. The more users do things, even mistakenly, the more 
algorithms could “learn.” What is celebrated as, for example, 
new knowledge in the preconscious, world-connectedness of 
the body, is always usable for economic advantages, too. It is 
essential, therefore, to examine the current discourse land-
scape according to its reference to a “regime of affects” (Angerer 
2007), co-opting human agents unquestioningly, extensively, 
and pervasively. They are so enchanted with this (Sprenger 2016) 
that the concealed modes of data collection and analysis, as well 
as the interests of major players (Amazon, Google, Facebook), 
are happily supported. A continuous data supply, consumed in 
ignorance of its politics, would thus be the meaning and purpose 
of participation in technological environments.
In this light, non-knowledge and incomprehensibility are 
important elements in a history of fascination, which the 
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and incomprehensibility serve to blind and distract human 
agents. In such a way, the epistemology after the hermeneutic 
mutates to a politics and a regime of non-knowledge and 
incomprehensibility.
The great challenge is now to develop new descriptions, what is 
absolutely required by the constitution of digital cultures, without 
overlooking their politics and governmental aspects. In digital 
cultures now, according to the hypotheses, the starting point is 
a non-resolvable simultaneity of these two processes, so that 
an unceasing balancing act between ontological description and 
reflection will be necessary.
With that in mind, the task is therefore to consult and make the 
new descriptions readable as discourse and still reveal their 
potential for an understanding of, and a way of dealing with, 
digital cultures. So how could the technological affecting of smart 
things on people be described? How could the technological 
environments be seen, without overlooking the demand for 
totality (Engemann and Sprenger 2015b, 58) that they and the 
discourses of the weak ontologies carry with them? These 
undertakings must—and this is the great challenge—occur under 
the premise that comprehension and knowledge are hampered, 
perhaps forever lost, because of technical blackboxing, the 
entanglement in digital cultures, and the interlinking between 
method and discovery (Pias 2015). At issue, therefore, is critique in 
digital cultures that is concerned with technologically induced, yet 
discursively produced, non-knowing and incomprehensibility.
How to Do Critique? Performing Discourses 
and Technology in Exhibiting Dysfunctional 
Things 
To carry out analysis and reflection, a form of examination 
is required that allows, under the discursively generated 
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at the same time takes into account that there is neither a 
stable “beyond digital cultures,” nor the possibility of under-
standing in the traditional hermeneutic sense. What critique 
under these conditions could look like is to be elucidated in 
the exhibition-performance “Dysfunctional Things” (Versehrte 
Dinge), which originated at Leuphana University in Lüneburg with 
students from different programs of study under the banner 
“complementary studies” in the winter semester 2015/16. The 
departure point for the project was the following consideration: 
our technological situation is, it is said, determined by the fact 
that we and our smart technical things (e.g., smartphones, 
tablets, fridges, blenders, fitness trackers, and GPS watches), 
which often know more about us than we do ourselves, live in 
a symmetric agency. If things and technological environments 
(such as traffic systems, smart cities, shopping centers) now have 
their own rights and capacity to act, can we then, for example, 
simply dispose of those that are malfunctioning? If that is now 
inappropriate, what would it mean for humans to be surrounded 
by dysfunctional technical things? These issues were carried by 
concerns about illuminating the current discourse landscape of 
digital cultures with the help of exaggerated affirmation of their 
theoretical description. By doing so the constitution and the 
effects of non-knowledge and incomprehensibility should also be 
experienced. 
The Exhibition8
To explore these questions, an “Owlglass (Till Eulenspiegel) 
prank,” or the art, according to Bazon Brock, of the affirmative 
word-taken-literally (Brock 1986, 288), was conducted. At the 
center stood the exaggerated affirmation of and identification 
with the equality of things and human agents, and the 
8 For the complete project documentation, including images, video, and fur-
ther analysis, see: Leeker 2016.
65subsequent dethronement of the latter. The hypothesis was that 
it is easy to develop theories, but how seriously these theories 
can be taken can be seen only when they are embodied—
because in this process, relevance, consequences, and govern-
mentality of theoretical constructs become recognizable when 
obtained through experience. So the strategy of dealing with 
and testing the analyzed ambivalent situation of knowledge 
and critique was to generate theory by acting out discourses 
as well as technological conditions. Embodying and performing 
should generate knowledge. This kind of practical forming of 
theory and knowledge seems also to be adequate in the decen-
tralized situation of human agents, as the practices of acting out 
and embodiment are always implemented in surroundings and 
dependent on the indeterminacy of performing, so that there 
shouldn’t be any danger of falling back into ideas of autonomous 
subjects. The questions for these experiments were: What 
would cultures look like if the theories mentioned were put into 
practice? How far will we go in the acceptance of things and our 
own disempowerment? 
To perform this Owlglass prank, the students built or brought 
malfunctioning things. The things were to have defects, but still 
be functional. With their dysfunctions, so the thinking goes, they 
would impose specific behaviors on the human users, which 
would make visible and palpable how dys/functional things shape 
humans.
The exhibition and performances with the dysfunctional things 
raised a veritable parallel world of agency of things and humans. 
It was like a contemporary science fiction in which what is said 
has already become everyday culture. A look at the projects is 
illustrative of this.
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[Fig. 1] Exhibition: Dysfunctional Things. Photography: Martina Leeker & Laila 
Walter, Lüneburg 2016.
Interfaces, through which human agents gain access to 
technological environments, are important in digital cultures. 
Interfaces enable not just control of technological operations; 
they shape, through their design, the behavior of users. They 
are therefore a sensitive gateway to the technological worlds 
and models and regimes of human-machine interaction. The 
exhibition asks what would happen when, assuming a radical 
equality of things, interfaces are disrupted and cannot be 
thrown away? In this context, a workstation was created that 
had a defective computer mouse, which performed self-willed 
movements enabling the production of strange drawings.
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[Fig. 2] Exhibition: Dysfunctional Things. Project: Train your Brain ( Jan-Erik Förster). 
Photography: Martina Leeker & Laila Walter, Lüneburg 2016.
There is a big diff erence between criticizing an interface for poor 
user-friendliness, and thoughtfully taking it into account and 
being glad of disruptions. 
[Fig. 3] Exhibition: Dysfunctional Things. Project: Betreuungszentrum für 
grenzüberschreitende Geräte / Care Center for Cross-Border Devices ( Julie Heit-
mann, Nadine Teichmann, Franziska Debey). Photography: Martina Leeker & Laila 
Walter, Lüneburg 2016.
68 The “Betreuungszentrum für grenzüberschreitende Geräte” 
(BGG) (Care Center for Cross-Border Devices) was another work. 
Here, dysfunctional things could be put into care so that they 
wouldn’t cause damage left unattended. At the BGG, a com-
pletely unique educational and behavioral culture ensued, which 
ranged from psychological training with device co-operators for 
appropriate contact with technical things, to new courses in elec-
tropedagogy, for example. 
In the artificial world of dysfunctional things, the “Market for 
Dysfunctional Smartphones” marked the station that congenially 
spelled out the economic side of the new world of things and 
data. When people can no longer get rid of their smartphones, 
a peculiar business could be created with their purchase. This 
business idea was implemented by an ingenious start-up. 
Owners of dysfunctional smartphones could offer them for 
purchase to the new company via the Internet. The enterprising 
business could then accept payment from the former owner to 
appropriately store the device on their behalf. 
[Fig. 4] Exhibition: Dysfunctional Things. Project: Markt für versehrte Smartphones 
/ Market for Dysfunctional Smartphones (Laila Walter). Photography: Martina 
Leeker, Lüneburg 2016.
69As an example of the storage, a dysfunctional smartphone was 
presented on an altar decked out with lavish offerings like exqui-
site fruits and flowers.
Data rights have become a very important topic in the world 
of Owlglass prank in the exhibition, because smart things are 
technical devices controlled by algorithms collecting and process-
ing data.
[Fig. 5] Exhibition: Dysfunctional Things. Project: Magna Carta der Datenrechte / 
Magna Charta of Data Rights (Martina Keup). Photography: Martina Leeker & Laila 
Walter, Lüneburg 2016.
In data rights now, as based on human rights, the right to the 
protection of life, to freedom of movement, and to assembly 
(compatibility) have been conceded to data. One consequence 
of these rights is, for example, that because of freedom of 
movement human agents should no longer be allowed to use 
methods of data protection. 
The Owlglass Prank as a Method of Critique  
and Resistance
The exhibition-performance concerns itself with both sides of 
the current discourse landscape outlined here, namely (1) the 
discourse of the techno-ecology and (2) the digital mysterium. 
70 One focus was on the forms of non-knowledge and incom-
prehensibility produced by them, which were affirmed and 
thereby criticized. 
(1) The discourse-on-things and on techno-ecology were taken 
on seriously and experienced in an exaggerated manner. Non-
knowledge and incomprehensibility generated by these dis-
courses, which emerged from the complex agencies and the 
technological environments, became new possibilities of (non-)
knowledge. This knowledge from non-knowledge, and its effects, 
were clear and concise in the “Kleiderflüsterin” (clothes whis-
perer). New levels and forms of sensibility were reached by lis-
tening to damaged clothes and hearing of their desire for repairs. 
[Fig. 6] Exhibition: Dysfunctional Things. Project: Kleiderflüsternde Nähwerkstatt 
/ Clothes Whispering Sewing Room (Nadine Teichmann). Photography: Martina 
Leeker & Laila Walter, Lüneburg 2016.
It had the effect of, among other things, stitching together the 
arms of her sweater and so “dysfunctionalising” the wearer’s 
hands. In the exhibition it was, however, immediately clear that 
71these new forms of knowledge arise from imaginings and—
as with the Kleiderflüsterin—could be loaded with animistic 
reminiscences. 
The Owlglass prank was also an attempt to explore (2) the pro-
claimed digital mysterium. What was remarkable was that in the 
exhibition, the mysterium had already become an integral part 
of the dysfunctionally functioning everyday world. A particularly 
striking expression of this was the “Declaration of Data Rights 
of Things.” Because with it, the digital mysterium became, in the 
shape of the inviolability of data, the law, and human agents its 
co-operative partners. 
In the examination of both discourses, exaggerated affirmation 
was the trigger for critical reflection. Through the performers and 
the visitors entering the discursive landscapes, affirming them 
and living them, their critical, political, or governmental aspects 
could light up—so the performing of exaggeration produced its 
own theoretical input. 
Knowledge of Tricksters
The exhibition had the task of enabling, through exaggerated 
affirmation and performance, a discourse analysis of digital 
cultures in periods of impeded or thwarted hermeneutics. It was 
crucial to produce embodiment and performance as an epis-
temological device that could generate and train the ambivalent 
thinking described here, which correlates with a balancing act 
between description and analysis. To do this, the performers 
acted as “tricksters.” This hybrid figure was of interest because 
tricksters, according to Erhard Schüttpelz (2010), not only disrupt 
the consensus but above all provoke conflicting interpretations 
and ensnare those affected in an unresolvable contrariness. A 
thing is not simply either good or bad, but always both and, fur-
thermore, a third thing in which contradictions are conveyed as 
not mediative.
72 This status of the trickster thus corresponds to the previously 
mentioned constitution of digital cultures. New descriptions 
of the “situation” are in fact necessary and yet they have to 
be checked constantly according to their discursive, political 
and governmental effects, and potential. In this situation, the 
trickster and the thinking that he provokes can be considered 
an appropriate epistemological stance and exercise for digital 
cultures—because they set up permanent, cognitive-affective 
multi-stable figures with which various kinds of re-thinking can 
be activated and supported. 
In this way, digital cultures get into a state of liminality 
(Schüttpelz 2010) via tricksters, a transience that never ends and 
will not culminate in any new order. The trickstery becomes thus 
a form of action and thinking that could influence digital cultures 
by intervening in ontologization with exaggerated affirmation and 
contradictions.
How to go on? Practice of Critique  
in Digital Cultures
The reflective level and the standpoint of critique presented 
in the “Dysfunctional Things” project thus appeared to both 
performers and visitors as an embodiment and experience of 
theoretic visions and discourses as well as technological con-
ditions. That is to say, theory and conditions should become 
reflectable in action, so that the positions of critique in the 
“artificial worlds” arose from those worlds and their behavior 
within them. A “critique from aesthetic experience” and secondly 
an “aesthetic experience of critique” were enabled through the 
embodiment of theories in the exhibition in this way. 
This “practice of critique” responds to the constitution of the 
discursively and technologically generated state of knowledge, 
research, and critique in digital cultures, which, as mentioned, 
are being confronted with the dictum of non-knowledge, 
73incomprehensibility, pre-conscious sensing, and with continuous 
self/reflection and the simultaneity of new ontological description 
and critical analysis. Furthermore, digital cultures are constituted 
of ubiquitous infrastructures that form technological environ-
ments impossible to escape. The upshot of this is that critique 
lies in the discourses surrounding it and in the situation that is 
generated by the former, no longer positioned “outside,” which 
was, to date, considered essential. Instead of stepping outside 
of techno-cultural conditions, in the project a stepping into them 
was experimented with, which should make it possible to find 
a position of critique in the interior. This interior does not refer 
to the position of a subject. The exaggerated identification that 
makes things and human agents unfamiliar gives rise instead to 
an “inner as outer” and an “outer as inner.” In this configuration, 
it is about critique in and out of the entanglement with the 
surrounding environment. And it is to deal in a productive way 
with non-knowledge. 
After Criticism: Smuggling, Looking Away (Irit Rogoff), 
and Performing 
The “practice of critique” can be further defined as a method 
of reflection for digital cultures because it goes far beyond 
traditional forms of criticism, which became inefficient with the 
crisis of hermeneutics, and opposes vehemently any form of 
“criticism” (Rogoff 2003). Criticism, according to Irit Rogoff, was 
based on recognition and understanding, as it intended to make 
the invisible visible, condemn in- and exclusion, and denounce 
injustices.9 In place of this concept and practice of criticism, 
Rogoff puts “criticality” (2003). The point of departure for this 
concept is that one cannot stand outside of the situation that one 
9 For the “embodiment of critique” it is therefore necessary to move away 
from the criticism of judging and valuating, just as Michel Foucault has called 
for with suspending judgment (Sprenger 2014). Judging criticism must in fact 
be seen as its own discourse and separate regime because it makes claims 
to a sovereignty of interpretation (Rogoff 2003).
74 is criticizing. In digital cultures, a similar situation results from 
the interwovenness of methods, technologies, and discourses 
(on digital cultures as well as on critique) in which little exists 
beyond the digital. According to Rogoff, it is an “inhabitation of 
a condition in which we are deeply embedded as well as being 
critically conscious” (2006, 5). Even if it is presupposed in the text 
that the concepts of critique are also generated discursively, as, 
for example, the present-day loss of distance, and become real in 
this constitution, the ideas of Rogoff are of interest to follow-up 
methods of dealing with the emerged contemporary situation of 
the loss of distance. Rogoff proposes two methods with which 
this “inhabitation” could be realized. They could be tested for 
their value and also for the reflection and formation of theory in 
the technological and discursive conditions of digital cultures. 
Rogoff sees “smuggling” (2006) as a method to fulfill infiltration in 
established and legitimate order. Smuggling moves along borders 
and breaks through spots that are permeable. The goal of smug-
gling is not resistance or destruction, but existing in a different 
order in an established situation. In this constitution, smuggling 
is a quasi-part of the existing law and order and at the same time 
a method of their reflection.
To smuggling belongs “looking away” (Rogoff 2005). Looking 
away turns from an anti-hermeneutic impulse against “thorough 
inspection” that is bound up with the idea that preexisting 
meanings lying under the surface could be seen. Looking away, 
in contrast, would bring strange and unexpected events into 
existence and meaning would be vacant and fluid. Looking away 
is a way of participating in cultures, because with this method 
and attitude the power of discourse is questioned and other 
voices are heard. With regard to the proclaimed digital arcana, 
the voices of the excluded could be kept present before its gates 
with aesthetic displacements. 
The method of “performances of the Owlglass prank” could be 
added to the two other previously mentioned methods, as it had 
75been tested in the exhibition. Rather than the sensing and being 
shrouded in secrecy of the digital mysterium, the pranks employ 
the in/security and unpredictability of performance, with which 
an entirely different analysis of the power discourse could be 
formed. These allow the hermetic facades of the cultures of non-
knowing and incomprehensibility to be permeable, and produce 
insights into their discursive constitution and “politics.”
In/Forming Cultures: Inventing Alien Worlds 
What was tested in the project “Dysfunctional Things” as a 
method of intervening in the current discourses of the con-
stitution of digital cultures and critique shall be considered fur-
ther in conclusion. The question is how a concrete displacement 
in the discourse field of digital cultures and in the dispositif 
of technospheres could come about. It is above all a matter 
of allowing a different world view, and to imagine and realize 
different orders via these displacements. 
Fundamentally, “unlearning” (Sternfeld 2014) is essential for 
the formation of different cultures. But what has been learned 
cannot simply be forgotten, because it is embedded deeply in 
body and behavior. That is, the production of non-knowledge and 
incomprehensibility is at stake. This does not happen, however, 
in the context of a regime of secrecy or techno-ecology, but in 
the sense of experimentation with the thresholds of knowledge 
and non-knowledge. At stake here is the enabling of the re-
appropriation and displacement of what is sayable, visible, and 
interpretable. 
These forms and methods of productive critique can be 
integrated within the concept of “in/forming cultures.” This is 
proposed as a contribution to critique in the specific, techno-
logical, epistemological, and discursive conditions of digital 
cultures outlined here. What is meant by this is that (a) a sep-
arate, artificial, e.g., excessive, strange, and unfamiliar, culture is 
created, performed, and made accessible. This culture formation 
76 (b) “in/forms” existing cultures in terms of their education by 
reflecting them. From this double formation arises (c) in small 
scope, meaning local, temporary, case-specific displacements 
in the see- and say-able. From these, in turn, other stories and 
collective action spaces of self-empowerment may arise. This 
refers to the production of artificial and parallel worlds in which 
unfamiliar ways of living or unknown technological structures 
operate. They follow their own logic, with which they con-
tinuously infiltrate the dominant cultures. These parallel worlds 
would, therefore, on one hand expose the contra-factuality of 
existing cultures with the owlglassy exaggerated affirmation. On 
the other hand, they would survey and test as artificial worlds, 
for example, technological possibilities or other forms of life for 
their potential. It is entirely a matter of repeated questioning, 
reconsidering, and rethinking of the non-knowledge and incom-
prehensibility in digital cultures, in order to open and colonize a 
space of reflection and knowledge between technology and dis-
cursively produced non-knowledge. Much could, in fact, be quite 
different because—as set forth here—digital cultures are in large 
part created discursively and as such are politically useful.  
Thank you to the students of the “Dysfunctional Things” seminar 
for their projects.
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On the Side of Non-
Knowledge: Mistrust. 
Heinrich von Kleist’s The 
Duel on Big Data Curation
Jeannie Moser
This paper historicizes the ambivalent discourse 
on data and communication transparency that is 
epidemic in digital cultures by confronting it with 
a reading of Kleist’s novella, The Duel (1811). In the 
medium of literature, conditions of possibility for 
the production of relevant and reliable knowledge 
on the basis of data are subject to analysis and 
critique. Basic operations of data processing have 
proven to be fallible and corrupted by media, 
which, instead of reducing complexity, deepen it. 
In contradistinction to the trust that reduces this 
complexity, The Duel performs an epistemology 
of mistrust, which insists on the polyvalence, 
dubiousness, agility, and ephemerality of the data 
from which truth is supposed to appear.
MY GOD, Mae thought. It ’s heaven. 
– The Circle
Intro: Dystopic Transparency
Literature contributes to, shares, intensifies, radicalizes, and, 
sometimes, exaggerates current discourses and ideas. Regarding 
the latter, in Dave Eggers’ dystopic novel The Circle, computer 
systems collect, exchange, and provide such unbelievable 
quantities of information that all gaps in non-knowledge seem 
to be eliminated irrevocably. The novel relates a hip and fancy 
Silicon Valley culture fully saturated with digital technologies, 
which augur the disclosure, communication, and monitoring of 
simply everything, by everyone. It is a culture that absolutely 
refuses to admit the opaque, the withheld, the ambivalent, 
the incomprehensible, or the overlooked. Because each of 
those impermanent and negotiable non-knowledge derivatives 
indicates an utter insufficiency, the primary rule in this culture is: 
all that happens must be known. Secrets are lies, sharing is caring, 
and privacy is theft are the corresponding slogans of the gigantic 
Circle Corporation, which has centralized all services provided by 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, etc. into a media concept called 
TruYou. 
In The Circle, political governance, the governance of the self, 
and the governance of data all intermingle to form a highly 
sensitive alliance. Power structures are refaced in a radical way—
ostensibly as the ideal of transparency reverts into a tyranny of 
the visible. Both private individuals and public figures start to 
wear cameras, which transmit a 24/7 feed that can be followed 
and commented on by the whole net community. Surveillance 
gets democratized. Political and computer programs intersect in 
a software program called Demoxie that is supposed to facilitate 
83the most pure and direct democracy, a “democracy with your 
voice, and your moxie” (Eggers 2013, 396).
Big Data, Agency, and the Specter of 
Non-Knowledge
The Circle is an intensification of the present, as dystopias 
are in general. It strongly resembles open source tools like 
LiquidFeedback, which powers Internet platforms for proposition 
development and decision-making by “heeding the voice of 
constituencies on a permanent basis, feeding it back directly 
to political processes at hand” (Hendriks 2014). But, most 
notably, it amplifies a discourse that claims ignorance is irrev-
ocably something in need of correction (Proctor 2008, 2), and 
that everything one needs for such correction is freely available 
on the Internet. The masses of data that abound in a fluidized 
archive promise omniscience (Stalder 2015) and link omniscience 
to omnipotence: everyone will have the ability to become an 
autonomous and sovereign expert who detects the truth. 
What this discourse ignores, however, is that accessibility, trans-
parency, and truth are not actually identical. An accumulation 
of information alone does not produce truth. The direction is 
missing, the singular and binding meaning, namely, that which 
is reliant on distinctions (Han 2013, 17; Proctor 2008, 3). This is 
what Raymond Geuss, in his commentary on Jacques de Saint 
Victor’s The Anti-Political, correspondingly uses to counter 
demands for a direct Web 2.0 participatory democracy run by, 
for instance, pirate parties all over the world. In the 2015 book, 
the discussion concerns Western democracies of mistrust, which 
are marked by the querulousness of their politics. Its point of 
departure is the observation that individuals and movements 
who understand themselves as anti-political and who demand 
that the corrupt, opaque authorities and experts all abdicate 
are being increasingly affirmed, driven by an idea that lends 
itself to paranoia: that authorities and experts “actively work to 
84 organize doubt or uncertainty or misinformation to help maintain 
ignorance” (Proctor 2008, 8). 
Criticism and even skepticism of Geuss and de Saint Victor are 
directed at answers offered by the anti-political, which rest on a 
digitalization of politics. They are also directed at the phantasm 
of total transparency, which, purportedly, enables independent 
formation of opinions, judgment, and agency—conceptualized 
as being beyond the established, mistrusted critical faculties, 
brain trusts, representative instances, and institutions of power 
that control the flow of information (de Saint Victor and Geuss 
2015). In fact, power is concentrated in the ordering of data. Early 
modern political theory had already noticed that the essence of 
power lies in the government of channels through which infor-
mation passes (Vogl 2010). Agency condenses in filters that direct 
the data flow by supposing and separating the relevant and the 
irrelevant, dividing knowledge and non-knowledge from each 
other.
But, according to Geuss, the problem is not with the structure of 
(political) institutions, although they organize data, rather it is 
that political systems are always embedded in economic orders—
the blind spot of the anti-political. And from there it isn’t far to 
the much-praised transparency. Google’s algorithms dictate the 
boundaries of knowledge: “What one can know is the content of 
an average Google search,” Geuss writes, “a nearly unending flood 
of irrelevant facts, lies, speculative fantasies, half- and quarter-
truths, misleading insinuations, and completely uncontrolled 
expressions of opinions” (2015, 105f.; Stalder 2015). 
Still, even more fundamental and severe is the procedure 
itself, which grinds out the status of both knowledge and non-
knowledge. That status remains a matter requiring continuous 
negotiation. The borders between their areas of efficacy and 
legitimacy must be redrawn incessantly. And, for the most part, 
knowledge and non-knowledge are contaminated, calling for 
spaces of transition (Bies and Gamper 2012). Seen in this light, 
85the dream of total knowledge and the specter of ignorance are 
equally bound to digital technologies. But that is something not 
actually specific to digital culture’s new electronic media: 
the ubiquity of the Internet, the increasing monopolization 
of the flow of data by companies like Google and Microsoft 
and the nearly incomprehensible bulk of information (of 
completely unclear epistemic value) depict at best the 
intensification of an already problematic epistemic crisis situ-
ation. (Geuss 2015, 107)
Epistemic Crisis 
Knowledge, as digital technologies are providing it, discursively 
figures as a cache of electronically preserved and accessible 
data. But it is still confronted with the dilemma produced by the 
steady urgency of ordering, evaluating, and structuring these 
confusing masses of data. A persistent difficulty is segregating 
the meaningful from the meaningless, and thereby establishing 
the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge—that 
is what has precipitated the epistemic crisis. So even if digital 
cultures consider themselves as having escaped from the realm 
of non-knowledge, access to data doesn’t suffice. Effective agency 
depends on the mutability of individual data points. It depends 
on the ability to recognize the relevant connections—in other 
words, on complex and extremely critical processing procedures 
worth a closer look.
The diagnosis of an intensifying epistemic crisis attending big 
data means, from a historical perspective, that the crisis is of 
longue durée; the threshold had appeared by 1800 at the latest. 
Since then, the question of the conditions of possibility and the 
boundaries of knowledge has been pressing, and boils down to 
the paradoxical conclusion: “knowledge of one’s ignorance is a 
precondition for enlightenment” (Proctor 2008, 5). The question 
arises because knowledge is no longer merely collected. The 
problem of the production, storage, and transmission of data 
86 produced by the state, by people, by science, by nature, and by 
economics arises. How can it be curated? What is relevant to the 
contemporary situation? From around 1800, knowledge branches 
out into forms of organization and administration intended to 
make data operable. Gaps between the multiplicity of things, 
contingent masses of data and ordering principals, between the 
state and the individual that produce spaces of non-knowledge, 
are asking to be closed (Schäffner 1999).
Coevally, by no means at all, is it extraordinary to dream the 
dream of transparency, to state that appearances are deceiving 
or to press charges against (aristocratic) camouflage and dis-
simulation. The terms that are seeing inflationary usage and con-
cern are: to debunk, disclose, publicize and expose (Starobinski 
1988, 12; Schneider 2013).
Heinrich von Kleist’s The Duel
It was during this historic state of epistemic crisis that Heinrich 
von Kleist wrote novellas, plays, newspaper articles, and 
numerous private letters by hand. Notwithstanding his analogous 
reference system, it is Kleist to whom current media theory 
owes insights into procedures of data curation, the challenging 
and awkward practices and techniques that are essential to the 
conversion of vast reams of data into relevant knowledge, and 
in turn, to the restriction of non-knowledge. Uniquely, all of his 
writings reflect and examine the very same epistemic system 
transformations that have been gaining momentum since 1800—
linking them to a fundamental media critique.
Describing transmission, perception, administration, and 
management of information almost obsessively, his writings 
process—even in the mode of presentation itself—the ways in 
which knowledge is subject to media. In his writings, an issue 
is made of the fact that media increase complexity rather than 
reduce it. In whatever form, communication is attended by 
random noise. Kleist’s texts perform failures, misinterpretations, 
87overhasty and lazy conclusions. They highlight the disability 
and oppression that escort enlightenment’s optimistic claims 
to universality. In turn, the equality and honesty of sources and 
information providers hang in the balance. Determining truth is 
always a risky operation full of vulnerabilities. And the invis-
ibleness of power technologies remains. 
The novella The Duel appeared in print in 1811. The author, 
corresponding to a world of analogous media, dislocates us, 
thrusting us into a world not even acquainted with the printing 
press. He displaces us into a world organized by neither republic 
nor democratic principles.
The Duel begins with the depiction of a murder that occurs at 
the end of the 14th century. The Duke of Breysach, who has just 
effected the legitimation of a son born out of wedlock as the heir 
to the throne, is shot by an arrow. His half-brother, Jacob Rotbart, 
with whom he had lived in a state of feud, is under suspicion for 
being the owner of the arrow and having been absent at the time 
of the offense. But Rotbart claims, in front of the court, that he 
spent the night with Littegarde von Auerstein, who, according 
to the narrator, one must know had “until the utterance of this 
scandalous slur, enjoyed the purest and most blameless of rep-
utations” (293).1 As evidence, he presents a ring that he received 
as a parting gift from Littegarde, and, in turn, raises charges 
against her. Littegarde’s father, Winfried von Breda, receives 
the scandalous notification concerning his daughter and, upon 
reading the court’s “terrible communication,” he is immediately 
seized by apoplexy (294f.). Littegarde is subsequently cast out of 
the house of Breda by her brothers, which leads to dissent con-
cerning the inheritance after the death of the patriarch. 
Only Friedrich von Trota, the chamberlain of the murdered Duke 
of Breysach, is convinced of Littegarde’s innocence. Assured of 
1 References to The Duel translated by David Luke and Nigel Reeves (1978) 
are only indicated with page numbers. Paraphrases refer to Der Zweikampf  
(1994).
88 the falsity of Rotbart’s testimony, the chamberlain challenges 
Rotbart to a holy duel. During this ordeal, which subjected the 
defendant to a game of strict rules, a struggle with his own 
body (Foucault 2002, 712), Friedrich is, curiously, badly injured. 
The injury is seen as the end of the fight, so trumpets sound a 
threefold flourish and Rotbart sets “his foot on the fallen knight’s 
breast” (306). Friedrich and Littegarde are sentenced to death 
due to sinful invocation of divine judgment. But then the story, 
due to a “strange and remarkable fact,” takes an “unexpected 
turn of events” (313f.), which, considering Kleist, is not actually all 
that unexpected.
The Truth Mediated by Evidence and Ordeal
The story makes an effort to illuminate multiple cases that are 
tightly interlocked. Criminal guilt, deception, virtue, and honor 
come into play. But the story is much more about the recon-
struction, or simply the construction, of that which is not known. 
It concerns an agitation in the gray area between knowledge and 
ignorance, which simultaneously grasps the store of secured 
knowledge and, on the other hand, reaches out towards that 
which cannot or cannot yet be known—in other words, towards 
procedures and practices of investigation. And those are linked to 
epistemic media. 
Both earthly and divine courts are convened, and throughout the 
story, things are inspected, and papers are shipped—inquiries, 
letters, and fragments of documents and files. These are read, or, 
more exactly, often over-read, and then evidence is presented, 
witnesses are called and investigated, private conversations 
are conducted as interrogations, statements are collected, and, 
finally, everything is interpreted. It can therefore be said of The 
Duel that it takes the conditions of possibility for the production 
of relevant and reliable knowledge on the basis of data as the 
focal point of its reflections. Exploiting the register of trans-
parency, it forces the question about that which actually is to 
reveal or to pervade—and furthermore it asks whether the 
89disclosed, if it were there, would even be recognized or would, in 
contrast, be overlooked several times (cf. Claus Pias' and Timon 
Beyes' contribution to this volume).
Lacking a thrilling plot or an ingenious investigator figure, and 
instead coming up with abrupt shifts in perspective, curious and 
implausible changes of characters, of lines of action, as well as 
of topics, the novella mainly addresses data curation operations 
themselves. The medium of literature turns into a program of 
observation of non-knowledge and its administration. At the 
core of the novella is the question of how, or whether it is even 
possible that something can be taken from a confusing collection 
of contingencies and be identified as significant—touching on 
the very difference between the availability and the classifiability 
of data. The boundaries to which it leads are the boundaries of 
certainty—namely, beyond the inquisitorial means of truth deter-
mination (Bergengruen 2011, 135). 
On the one hand, the story takes us into a medievally tinted 
version of a debate about reasoning on the basis of evidence 
as it was established in the eighteenth century. It sets forensic 
practice as a philological-hermeneutical method of reading 
written and spoken signs, things and facts into motion, all of 
which, however, are staged as liminal phenomena and are 
equipped with an index of illegibility. On the other hand, divine 
judgment is supposed to decide the dispute through supernatural 
signs. It is God who shall safeguard communication against bias, 
disaccord, and dubiety (Hahn 2008, 286). Hence, the text, we can 
say with Roland Reuß, depicts the duel less in the context of the 
question of justice than in the context of the contentious core of 
truth. 
The sacred verdict of arms in the holy duel—which, strictly 
speaking, is a binary-structured game that determines victory or 
defeat (Foucault 2002, 713)—is supposed to determine truth in a 
legal dispute and should, infallibly, bring that truth to light (303). 
The truth is therefore not entirely independent of the question of 
90 what the fighting subjects hold to be true. But the gap between 
the desired manifestation of truth and the subject-bound claims 
of truthfulness in Kleist’s texts is depicted as irresolvable (Reuß 
1994, 8f.).
If God’s word is supposed to adjudicate on Rotbart’s statement, 
or as it says in the story, to decide “the truth of the testimony 
against [Littegarde] to which he has sworn,” (303) it is actually 
completely unambiguous and transparent. But neither the 
spectators of the duel nor the readers of The Duel are capable of 
knowing that in the moment. Which is why and where the story 
takes its surprising turn: an “apparently insignificant” scratch 
(314) that Rotbart sustains develops into a lethal wound, whereas 
the defeated Trota returns to flourishing health and demands 
that the battle continue. The text, therefore, produces differing 
opinions about the proper method of reading God’s message, if 
not about its fundamental legibility: “What mortal man,” Trota 
asks, “could presume to interpret the mysterious verdict God has 
delivered in this duel?” (307). The text unites the evidence and 
the institution of the duel by turning it, in equal measure, into an 
uncertain matter of interpretation, an erratic question of analysis 
and negotiation. Their maximal epistemic resilience is subject to 
rigorous testing.
Trust as the Radiant Hero of the Story
Contemporary evidence, as well as the anachronistic trial by 
ordeal (it had already disappeared from European juridical life 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), proves unreliable. It 
is, instead, demonstrated to be in need of interpretation and 
therefore subject to erroneous human imputations. Both are, 
therefore, associated with a non-juridical option. The story 
introduces another entity, which seems to unlock a direct and 
immediate path to the truth: Kleist makes trust into the radiant 
hero of his story, personified in the figure of Friedrich von Trota, 
the glowing advocate of Littegarde’s innocence. This corresponds 
to the discursive condensation through which trust reveals itself 
91as imperial, and which, like the threshold of the epistemic crisis, 
is datable to 1800: the trusting and trustworthy person as a 
subject of agency enters into the limelight.2 Mistrust, in turn, is 
discredited and arrives only as a specter.
When Littegarde’s brothers, who are busy speculating about their 
inheritance, cast her out, she turns to Trota for help. When she 
tells him what happened, he interrupts her: 
Say no more … There is a voice that speaks for you in 
my heart, and it carries a far livelier conviction than any 
assurances, indeed than all the evidence and proofs which 
the combination of events and circumstances may well 
enable you to bring in your favor before the court at Basle. 
(299) 
To demonstrate her irreproachability, Trota tenders himself to 
Littegarde as an attorney of trust, who, through a combination 
of thought and unwavering feeling, of knowledge and faith, 
expects certainty. The case becomes an anti-juridical matter of 
the heart, which demands a pledge to the law of the heart. As 
trust shows as a gap in communication, which demands a leap 
in the dark that may have fatal consequences, and, at the same 
time, has to be made out of communication (Hahn 2008, 229), 
the voice of the heart competes against the language of the 
ambivalent pieces of evidence and of text. Feelings and morality 
are placed in opposition to reflection, appearances, criminalistic 
logic, and against “arbitrary human laws” (308), such as those that 
determine that a fight is at its end at the statement of a judge and 
cannot begin again. With Anne Fleig following Niklas Luhmann, 
trust is placed at the center of the story as an unconditional trust. 
It becomes a risky advanced payment, performed as a practice. 
Trust gambles itself, and the stakes are high—divine judgment 
risks a battle of life and death (Fleig 2013, 98).
2 For the wide-ranging research literature cf. exemplarily Fleig 2013; Frevert 
2003 and 2013; Hardin 2004 and 2006; Hartmann 2011; Luhmann 2009; and 
Reemtsma 2008.
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gap and translating non-knowledge (once it acquired a professed 
form) directly into action even where there is no transparency 
(Han 2013, 78f.). Its discursive antagonist, mistrust, on the other 
hand, is an opposite posture towards an abundance of data of 
entirely uncertain epistemic value. Precisely by keeping the gap 
between knowledge and non-knowledge open and broadening it 
by strong imaginations, it becomes productive and might agitate 
critically. Quite remarkably, though The Duel is a text in which 
trust makes a fulminant appearance, it also performs this options 
and possibilities augmenting specter posture in parallel.
The Mistrust of the Emperor
Unlike trust, mistrust does not at first glance appear to figure 
in The Duel. The character from which it proceeds receives little 
space to reveal or define himself. It is the emperor. He enters 
the action in his function as the bearer of power without being 
at all fleshed out in either a psychological or a narrative sense. 
Nevertheless (or therefore) insights into the function and the 
operational mode of mistrust can be adduced. There is one pas-
sage where mistrust appears explicitly, and it is not just any pas-
sage, but an extremely sensitive moment: precisely where both 
the process of converting the unknowable and the narrative take 
an unexpected turn. Trota and Littegarde are condemned to an 
ignominious death by fire, and the sentence: 
would have been carried out at once, … if it had not been the 
Emperor’s secret intention that Count Jakob Rotbart, against 
whom he could not suppress a certain feeling of mistrust, 
should be present at the execution. But the strange and 
remarkable fact was that Count Jakob still lay sick of the small 
and apparently insignificant wound which Herr Friedrich had 
inflicted on him … and all of the skill of the doctors … could 
not avail to close it. Indeed, a corrosive discharge of a kind 
quite unknown to the medical science of those days, began 
93to spread through the whole structure of his hand, eating it 
away like a cancer right down to the bone; in consequence, 
…, it had become necessary to amputate the entire diseased 
hand, and later, … his entire arm. But this too, … merely had 
the effect of, as could easily have been foreseen nowadays, 
increasing the malady instead of relieving it; his whole body 
gradually began to rot and fester, until the doctors declared 
that he was past saving and would even die within a week. 
(313f.)
The emperor’s mistrust, which appears to be only one of many 
kinds of mistrust, does not receive closer attention. Initially, it 
seems only to motivate the sovereign, the supreme embodiment 
of authority, who unites all powers of agency (though he is 
nevertheless dependent on the information and expertise of 
the court and of judges) to wish that Rotbart be present at the 
execution. Mistrust thereby makes space for a knowledge and a 
knowing subject that wishes to see with its own eyes in order to 
evaluate the data produced by Rotbart’s body: maybe excitations 
and signs of affect, which, in the eighteenth century, within the 
system of evidentiary proceedings, gain importance as data 
worth being registered and protocolled (Weitin 2005 and 2009). 
However, it is not the emperor’s eyes that examine the wounds, 
the marks and body signs, but the eyes of doctors. Conditioned 
by an epistemology of suspicion (Vogl 1991), they look at a hand, 
which by degenerating is dedicated to mediate something that 
is detracted, invisible, and unknown. They look at the very part 
of the body, which, in turn, no longer functions as a medium: 
by writing, for example, or performing symbolic gestures, like 
swearing an oath. The medical view intersects with the imperial 
bird’s eye view, but the authority of the interpretation of signs 
and of expertise is displaced onto the field of science (Foucault 
1973)—even if the knowledge produced there is shown to be rel-
ative and weak. It is depicted as being in danger because of the 
time: nowadays, whenever “nowadays” might be, something com-
pletely different could be foreseen easily, and then it will become 
94 outdated, turning into something of a kind quite unknown again. 
Aside from that, and in addition to the hegemony of medical 
expertise, the emperor, with his will to knowledge, is overtaken, 
outmaneuvered, and made obsolete in an entirely different 
manner—namely, it is the text itself that does not afford him an 
active role. 
Disclosures
The emperor’s mistrust, which is so minimally explicated at a 
contentual level, has a powerful effect on the progression of the 
story. Suddenly, the narration proceeds incredibly quickly—one 
must know, the narrator reveals, that Rotbart had an affair with 
the chambermaid Rosalie. Having since been spurned, Rosalie 
pretends to be Littegarde and spends the night of the crime 
with Rotbart and gives him the ring, which she had stolen from 
Littegarde. Nine months later, as the story goes, “the con-
sequences of her immoral life became visible” (317). Rosalie 
names Rotbart as the father of the child and proves it with a ring 
that he (after all, he thought she was Littegarde) had sent to her 
in return for her gift to him. Supported by this “obvious piece 
of evidence,” a petition for paternal support is submitted to the 
court. The court sends the testimony of Rosalie as well as the ring 
to the imperial tribunal in hopes of clearing up “the terrible mys-
tery, which had become the chief topic of conversation” (317). 
Rotbart, after reading the letter and being given the ring, 
now confesses immediately to responsibility for the Duke of 
Breysach’s death and to having engaged the archer: “I am the 
murderer of my brother.” With this declaration, he sinks back 
onto the litter and whispers his “black soul into the air.” It is the 
body of the fratricide, instead of the innocent, that is consumed 
in red flames on the pyre. The moral legitimation of the duke’s 
illegitimate son as his successor follows its juridical legitimation 
(Schneider 2003). Littegarde is returned to her paternal 
inheritance by an imperial decree and only three weeks later she 
celebrates her marriage to Trota. 
95The story finally gets—and this, actually, is surprising in a Kleist 
story—its happy ending: Rotbart’s confession resolves the 
criminal case, while the sum and the concluding interpretation 
of the data produce a comprehensive picture of his offense and 
of Littegarde’s innocence. The internal voice of her confidant, 
Trota, seems to have spoken the truth and been the key to the 
solution. It is, however, the emperor’s mistrust that made this 
happy ending possible, and which ensured that the process of 
finding the truth could be brought so effortlessly to a conclusion. 
The unexpected turn of events is indebted to a mistrust that lets 
the story stagnate at a crucial point, which interrupts the chain of 
events and provides for a deferment. In other words, without the 
emperor’s mistrust the case would have seen an entirely different 
conclusion—an entirely different truth: Trota and Littegarde 
would have long since been executed. 
Amendment
It is mistrust, which, through its insistence on semantic open-
ness, initiates the amendment of every decision made as a 
consequence of interpretation, such that data lose their pre-
vious evidentiary power and consolidated knowledge begins to 
degenerate. Conversely, facts that initially seemed insignificant 
become meaningful details and new pieces of evidence, which 
serve to expand the body of evidence: because it begins to fester, 
Rotbart’s apparently insignificant wound becomes a meaningful 
trace that leads to the black soul of the terrible. At the same time, 
it is only the delay in the execution of the sentence that can con-
firm Rotbart’s belief that he himself was deceived. 
Eyewitness accounts from tower guards and a lady’s maid, 
about which the text has said little or nothing up until this point, 
can now be brought into play. Newly introduced data receive 
consideration: the first ring, initially and falsely used as an alibi 
for Rotbart, and as evidence of Littegarde’s moral failing, now 
testifies to the moral failing of her thieving chambermaid and is 
chained to a second ring, which testifies to both the paternity of a 
96 child conceived out of wedlock and the deceptive bait and switch 
carried out by the maid. A suit for paternal support can be tied to 
the remarkable legal proceedings, and because they are united in 
this manner, can collaborate on the decipherment of the terrible 
mystery. All at once, the relevant connections providing agency 
are easy to recognize (Geuss 2015, 106).
Mistrust functions here to set the narration in motion and to 
efficiently direct it to its “good” ending—not, then, the emperor 
himself. And Trota’s discursively incommunicable faith does just 
as little to effect the turn in events. Even if it seems as though 
he always knew, his feeling must first turn into an overwhelming 
evidentiary burden and be certified by a confession. That these 
clear data have any effect at all can be ascribed only to the decel-
erating delays of mistrust.
Polyvalence, Uncertainty, and Dubiousness of Data
This mistrust, which interrupts in order to effect the rapid 
acceleration in the deciphering of enigmatic events at the level 
of narration and brings them to their end in no more than two 
paragraphs, replaces an uneconomic and notoriously unprofit-
able narrative mode—a mistrusting narrative mode, which 
attaches a provision to all information. The emperor’s mistrust 
is tied to a mistrust that the text produces relentlessly. Up until 
this penultimate paragraph, in which the text finally discloses 
that which had been held in reserve through an interruption in 
the narrated action—the very thing that one must know in order 
to resolve the case—the text systematically multiplies the pos-
sible interpretations and connections until they are endless; it 
obscures and veils itself like the clever chambermaid. The text 
dictates the borders of knowledge—and presents itself as a 
netting of clear and indistinct explanations, of “plain speech and 
insinuation” (294).
What it doesn’t narrate is that which one might want to know: why 
the court doesn’t once take into account the fact that Rotbart 
97could have hired someone to carry out the deed intended to 
secure the throne for him, and why his motive is never con-
sidered. Or even why the widow of the Duke, whose very first 
inquiries demonstrate that the murder weapon, namely the 
arrow, came from Rotbart’s armory, an inquiry that also reveals 
that Rotbart was not in his castle at the time of the murder, then 
expresses her displeasure that the “ambiguous disclosures” 
of these researched charges (which she reads “twice through 
attentively”) should have been publically raised given that it was 
such an “uncertain and delicate matter,” and fears “any ill-consid-
ered action” (290). All of this despite the fact that the Duke had 
said on his deathbed, with broken words which she “then scarcely 
understood,” that he suspected his brother of the crime (320)—a 
statement the widow doesn’t remember until it assembles with 
the body of evidence, Rotbart’s confession and death grinding 
out the truth. 
Also inexplicable is why Littegarde refers to Trota. And why she, 
in turn, appears to him to be worthy of his trust. In being called 
to defend her honor, what sustains this faith in her innocence 
and makes him so decisively swear to prove that innocence, not 
in court but in a public event—the life and death ordeal of divine 
combat? All that, and much, much more remains shady. 
Any possible contextual meaning, on the other hand, is con-
stantly compromised. In the text, the polyvalence, uncertainty, 
and dubiousness of data, of signs, events, witnesses, statements, 
and facts—through which the truth is supposed to appear—is 
directly thematized. The chamberlain engages in two verbal 
duels that directly precede the emperor’s mistrust, first with his 
mother and then with Littegarde (Schuller 2000, 200), and says 
he can ignore divine judgment, forcing a climax of confusion and 
enigma as well as of epistemic crisis. Friedrich calls the temporal 
boundaries of divine combat into question, most especially 
its endpoint, at which God has delivered his judgment, and 
simultaneously assesses its conclusion as a construable state-
ment (Reuß 1994, 19). 
98 For the mother, the meaning of this divine statement does not 
remain dark, as she appeals to the authority of the law, according 
to which “a duel which has been declared by the judges to be con-
cluded cannot be resumed.” For Friedrich, however, the duel was 
brought to an end because of a “trifling accident” (307f.). “Arbi-
trary human laws” do not concern him. And in a certain sense 
rightly so: only because none of the spectators had doubted, as 
it is said, his death, the emperor, who is responsible for nothing 
more than compliance with the rules (Foucault 2002, 713), brought 
the fight to an end. As can be seen through the healing of the 
chamberlain’s wounds, which weren’t fatal after all, this decision 
was arbitrary and coincidental. For this reason alone, divine judg-
ment becomes complex and multivalent. 
What One Can Know
The text thereby fundamentally problematizes the difficulty, even 
the impossibility, of determining the limits and defining the truth 
about an event. Exactly that which one must know and therefore 
also that which one can know, is known in The Duel by exactly 
one agent: the invisible and omnipotent narrator. He—and not 
the emperor—figures as an ideal eyewitness, who advocates 
the truth of the occurrences and verifies them (Vogl 1991), but, 
at the same time, organizes, filters, and distributes data. He by 
himself is the authoritarian principle who organizes the forms of 
data deemed relevant, and of those to be removed, discarded, or 
declared trivial. 
He is the sovereign and the data processor who assesses 
and rates. Similar to a search algorithm like PageRank, which 
arranges what one will possibly know by assigning data to 
positions on the hit list, his guiding criteria are unsearchable and 
inscrutable—they remain (despite being an aesthetic and not a 
Google company) secret (Bergermann 2013, 100f.). But in contra-
distinction to the digital gatekeepers of the unending space of 
the Internet, he makes explicit the act of selection, of focusing on 
one thing, which is therefore invariably a choice to ignore another 
99(Proctor 2008, 7), the act of ranking, of indexing and indication. 
By twice revealing that which one must know, at least in these two 
short moments, he identifies and draws attention as well as sus-
picion to himself and his manipulative procedures. 
The narrator exposes himself as the one who monopolizes the 
flow of information as a manipulation tactic. And he arranges the 
possible clues so wastefully and wildly that the emperor, as it is 
said, goes crazy as a result.3 His politics is one of concealing trans-
parency, which Geuss describes in reference to digital cultures 
as often just as effective as the suppression and withholding of 
facts for procuring absolute secrecy. It is a politics that introduces 
so much that is irrelevant and misleading into the churning 
stream of information that both the contentual relation and the 
foundations through which determinations of knowledge and 
non-knowledge are made can no longer be recognized (Geuss 
2015, 106f.). Hence, finally, he is the one who communicates 
without anybody ever being on a par with him.
Taking Side with Non-Knowledge
Kleist’s The Duel makes the nameless emperor’s mistrust become 
the mistrust felt by the nameless reader, who must wait until 
that which one must know reaches him coincidentally. The novella 
does not do this, however, without transposing a clear and direct 
speech, through which the truth can appear, into the conditional. 
The final act of the emperor in the narration is namely this: 
he gave orders that in the statutes governing the sacred 
ordeal by combat, at all points where they assume that such 
a trial immediately brings guilt to light, the words “if it be 
God’s will” were to be inserted. (320)
3 The English translation describes his condition much more lightly: 
“somewhat shaken in his belief” (302).
100 The text closes with a correction that means as much as carrying 
the institution of divine combat itself ad absurdum (Reuß 1994, 
7). The medium of assumed immediate enlightenment loses its 
vigor. Even God’s dictum becomes devaluated, being now only 
decisive conditionally and under certain circumstances. Even God 
as the singular agent, who is lord over all of the data, who knows 
the present in all of its details, who can therefore meticulously 
describe and know the past and future of all worldly events—just 
as the probability theoretician Laplace conceptualized the con-
ditional intelligence later known as the Demon in 1814 (Laplace 
1932, 1f.), and as the protagonist Mae Holland, on entering 
the campus of The Circle for the first time thinks, “MY GOD … 
It’s heaven” (Eggers 2013, 1)—this agent appears in Kleist as 
incalculable and unreliable. Every data point, every event, every 
little piece of information is thereby provided with a degree of 
im/possibility and placed in a gray area between knowledge and 
non-knowledge (Schäffner 1999, 123)—where it remains. 
The last act of this mistrustful, nameless emperor, therefore, dis-
penses entirely with the idea of making data transparent, citing 
the systematic impossibleness and narrowness of transparency 
itself. And this act runs contrary to the efforts that were current 
in 1800, and also runs contrary to the digitalized phantasm of 
the knowledge society of today. In contradistinction to those 
anti-political apologists of the Internet whose mistrust is directed 
toward institutions and critical faculties with their expertise—
because they are so sure they are able to take the sovereign’s, the 
emperor’s place, and to have at their disposal the capacities and 
the media needed to know everything, but who also, in the same 
breath, attempt to delegate the curation of big data to equally 
obscure agents, economic interests, or the law of the algorithms, 
which become more and more complex by reprogramming 
themselves—the text of Kleist makes an issue of the operation 
per se. It foments mistrust as an epistemological principle, which, 
at facing an abundance of data, offensively takes sides with non-
knowledge. It rejects the idea of pervasion, of omniscience and 
101omnipotence, and it would rather not know than acknowledge 
the status quo. 
Therefore, it mobilizes contradictory imaginaries against one-
and-only options, as well as against assumed perspicuities, 
which in respect to the algorithms governing digital cultures 
are the average, the standard, and the habitual. In contradis-
tinction to an “obvious” relevance generated by PageRank, based 
on the citation index, for example, which counts on popularity, 
repetition, and frequency to guide decisions (Bergermann 2013, 
101; Stalder 2015), mistrust asks persistently if everything is really 
as it seems—or if everything is different after all? It animates us 
into observing, questioning, thinking, and imagining again. The 
emperor’s mistrust gathers the uncertainty of the scattered data 
from their latency. 
In distinction to trust, it neither substitutes the ignorance, nor 
effaces the ambivalence of the data, their complexity, agility, and 
ephemerality—rather it insists on them and keeps them virulent. 
Even if the text provides an abundance of data, the emperor’s 
mistrust reminds us that the gaps of non-knowledge are not to 
be eliminated: the significance, as well as the truth, only show 
up as random and temporary configurations. Both ignorance 
and knowledge are made and unmade incessantly. The text 
simultaneously demonstrates that communication, decision-
making, political judgment, and agency need not be tied to claims 
of absolute truth. Maybe it’s exactly the opposite: mistrust could 
then be a commendable posture of unsettled critique in the face 
of an epoch of alleged truth, of confessions, and of revelation—of 
total transparency directed both inwardly and outwardly. 
My thanks go to Peter Kuras for his translating assistance, and 
to Marianne Schuller for once giving me The Duel as a gift.
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Digitality, (Un)knowledge, 
and the Ontological  
Character of 
Non-Knowledge
Alexandre Monnin 
The dialectic between knowledge and non-knowl-
edge may obscure the very fact that digitization 
has also “remedied” knowledge, lending it the 
character of a commodity instead of a norm (which 
it was previously considered, despite the disagree-
ment on its proper characterization entertained 
by philosophers and epistemologists). Hence, one 
is required to situate not only non-knowledge 
vis-à-vis knowledge but also knowledge vis-
à-vis digitization and a third term I would call 
“unknowledge.” Non-knowledge is taken to be 
a necessary condition of many phenomena that 
are not reducible to knowledge, which, at the 
same time, is threatened by the generalization of 
digitally fueled unknowledge.
Although we have no word for it, establishing 
an appropriate degree of “middle connectivity” 
to the world is such a basic feature of the 
human condition that doing it successfully has 
been lifted into the rarefied reaches of saint-
hood and enlightenment; failing to accomplish 
it, identified as a cause of paralytic anxiety 
– Brian Cantwell Smith
The relationship between knowledge, non-knowledge, and 
digitality is a complex one, still waiting to be fully explored. As 
evidenced in this volume, efforts to shed some light on “non-
knowledge” open up new directions of research that are espe-
cially relevant, as we’ll see, in a world becoming more digitized 
every day. On the other hand, as such, the opposition between 
knowledge and non-knowledge tends to obscure the very fact 
that digitization has also “remedied” knowledge, lending it the 
character of a commodity instead of a norm (which it was pre-
viously considered, despite the disagreement entertained by 
philosophers and epistemologists among themselves). Hence, 
one is required not only to situate non-knowledge vis-à-vis 
knowledge but also knowledge vis-à-vis digitization. 
Knowledge, Digitality, and Unknowledge
Knowledge and Digitality: Epistemic Issues
Knowledge both admits of a vast number of characterizations 
and comes in different flavors. While it is possible to hold shared 
views on the purview of knowledge while at the same time dis-
agreeing on its exact definition, disagreement may still loom 
over the horizon. Whether tacit or practical knowledge refers to 
a phenomenon that can be subsumed under one heading along 
with scientific knowledge, or knowledge as traditionally conceived 
107by epistemologists, is a question that remains largely open to 
debate. 
For that reason, it would at first glance seem illusory to contrast 
(and not necessarily to oppose) a unified concept of knowledge 
with non-knowledge. Yet, without such a unified concept, 
the need for a correlative unified concept of non-knowledge 
becomes, at best, moot. The best-known philosophical answer 
to the question, “What exactly is knowledge?” has long been 
“justified true belief.” Despite the paradoxes this definition 
lends itself to (in particular the Gettier problem), let us take it 
as a departure point and add that knowledge is knowledge of a 
referent, whether in the form of an accurate description of it or 
true predictions regarding its behavior, etc. 
What about digitization, then? Digitization and knowledge have 
a complex and quite paradoxical relationship. Going back to 
the concept of “knowledge economy,”1 made possible by the 
advances of digitization, one immediately sees this relation for 
what it is: a relation of commodification. “Knowledge” in the 
knowledge economy no longer denotes any norm or domain 
(which it merely connotes) but rather betokens a broad assim-
ilation to a commodity, essentially cultivated in order to sustain 
growth. Both the normative and pluralistic aspects of knowledge 
have as a consequence seemingly vanished or at least been 
largely obscured. 
While paradoxical, this evolution shouldn’t come as a surprise for 
it may very well characterize digitization as such. As a result, one 
of the claims in this paper will be that digitality has both over-
played and downplayed salient aspects of knowledge, to the point 
that we might, on initial approximation, think of this evolution as 
bringing knowledge nearer to its negation, what might be called 
“non-knowledge.” As we shall see, however, as we progressively 
move away from epistemic questions, the case for introducing an 
1 See Christoph Wulf ’s contribution to this volume.
108 additional category and situating non-knowledge on a different 
plane will become more and more compelling.
Overplayed, I would argue, because conceptual knowledge 
already grasps its referent in a simplified way, if only to articulate 
true propositions where, for instance, proper nouns denote 
individuals, and common nouns denote properties (a con-
ceit still used within logical artificial intelligence (AI)). Math-
ematical models, despite potentially being very complex, must 
nonetheless simplify reality in order to allow for more accurate 
predictions. In this regard, they may be revised to accommodate 
some of the minute details of a world they never exhaust. 
Science, then, produces knowledge about the world but not nec-
essarily one conclusive picture. 
Now, with digitality, models and abstractions have become not 
only a sign of the portability of conceptual knowledge but also a 
means to perform assemblages that induce new realities instead 
of deferring, one way or another, to some preexisting world—
again in the name of simplification and formalization. Make no 
mistake: deferring to the world involves taking into account the 
intricate ways in which the world is being transformed by our own 
activity—especially in the Anthropocene! That said, digitization 
tends to consider its models within its own reality without always 
properly deferring to the world. Google’s PageRank algorithm 
is a good example. It construes incoming hyperlinks as votes or 
endorsements (never as signs of defiance!) in its willingness to 
redefine the web by using measures of authority, while pretending 
to remain neutral—even though its own existence modifies 
the very topology of the thing it was supposed to measure 
independently. 
And then downplayed since the commodification of knowledge, 
made possible by the lack of regard for traditional norms of 
knowledge (in a sense “anything goes” in the knowledge economy 
so long as its goals are achieved), resulted in more and more 
data, metadata, documents, and so on and so forth—what I 
109would term “knowledge traces”—being produced, gathered and 
made available with unforeseen consequences that are well 
worth examining. 
Innovation is better served, or so it seems, by people who have 
little regard for the minutiae of everyday life, assured as they 
are of the well-foundedness of their mission to transform it. 
Of course, one may ask a) How and why on earth should that 
which is not well enough grasped be transformed? And b) Is it 
even possible to ensure that the replacement (or modification) 
is something genuinely new? One could argue regarding the 
second objection that only induction through enumeration would 
provide a proper answer, and it is well known to be insufficient. 
Let’s put it aside then because, basically, we have to live with sim-
ilar “uncertainties.” 
The answer to the first objection is much less straightforward. 
Digital technologies produce new assemblages while at the same 
time claiming to operationalize preexisting realities (intelligence, 
authority, vote, trust, etc.). Changing the meaning of those con-
cepts/values/realities is seldom, if ever, an explicit goal. Rather, 
these realities are generally taken for granted and whether the 
ensuing operationalization turns out to be something wholly 
different, even in logical contradiction to what they previously 
stood for, is no one’s business.
Assemblages and performation have always marched hand in 
hand since assemblages perform, by definition, a specific effect. 
(Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation 2013). And from that arises 
the legitimate fear that focusing on assemblages alone might 
obfuscate any reference (and deference) to the world. Yet, the 
lack of regard displayed by innovators concerns not just the world 
but also the assemblages produced therein (the subsequent 
operationalization is always made with reference to preexisting 
realities, resulting in a common neglecting of both sides of the 
equation: that which is being operationalized and the end result 
of such operationalizations).
110 Thus, we go from knowledge to what we’d call “unknowledge”—
introducing this concept in order to characterize a specific 
contrast to knowledge akin to a lack of willingness to defer/refer 
to the world that is still unabashedly regarded as fully fledged 
knowledge.
Unknowledge is very well illustrated by this quote from Phil Agre 
about AI: 
As a practical matter, the purpose of AI is to build computer 
systems whose operation can be narrated using intentional 
vocabulary. Innovations frequently involve techniques that 
bring new vocabulary into the field: reasoning, planning, 
learning, choosing, strategizing, and so on. Whether the 
resulting systems are really exhibiting these qualities is 
hard to say, and AI people generally treat the question as an 
annoying irrelevance [my emphasis]. What matters practically 
is not the vague issue of what the words “really mean” but 
the seemingly precise issue of how they can be defined in 
formal terms that permit suitably narratable systems to be 
designed. If you disapprove of the way that we formalize 
the concept of reasoning or planning or learning, they are 
likely to say, then you are welcome to invent another way to 
formalize it. (Agre 1997)2
Unknowledge prolongs knowledge insofar as it seemingly shares 
the aim of formalizing phenomena, thus leaving aside part of 
their richness. Yet, unlike knowledge, always revisable and never 
able to exhaust what there is, unknowledge, by materializing and 
making directly operational its representations, is in danger of 
losing sight of its referent and becoming self-referential (digital 
formalizations are also a lot more expensive than pen and paper 
ones!). This is what Agre means with the quote above: in the end, 
2 I have suggested (Monnin 2015) that the roots of formalization thus con-
ceived lie in Rudolf Carnap’s concept of “explication,” to which scholars 
have turned their attention in recent years; see especially Carus 2007 and 
Richardson 2013.
111what the “words ‘really mean’” or what the world really is matters 
less than the design of new workable formal systems. We can 
thus conceive of unknowledge as a contemporary pathology 
of knowledge, albeit one that is rooted in some core aspects 
of knowledge itself, namely abstraction and/or discretization 
(without distinguishing them yet)—two essential forms of sim-
plification that are nevertheless always in need of a careful 
reining in. 
Non-Knowledge and Unknowledge:  
An Ontological Characterization
With unknowledge in sight, what can be said about non-
knowledge? Brian Cantwell Smith contends that content, a 
technical term used in analytic philosophy to designate the basis 
of knowledge and action, can be either conceptual or non-con-
ceptual. Conceptual content involves positing a world consisting 
of objects, properties and relations, which amounts to carving 
reality into discretized individuals (seen as the bearers of 
properties and in relation to one another). Non-conceptual con-
tent, while still representational, registers the world not in the 
same way but rather in terms of un-individuated “features” that 
precede the advent of objects or individuals—something which, 
for Smith, is essentially an ethical matter (a matter of “mattering” 
as he puts it). The picture offered by non-conceptual content is 
essentially a “subobjective”3 one. Whereas non-conceptual con-
tent depicts the world in overwhelming detail, fit for situated and 
local encounters, conceptual content and objectivity in general 
strip it of those same details so as to make it possible to make 
reference over long distances (to distant things, things long gone 
3 See Lowe 1992, whose subtitle is composed of three texts by Adrian Cussin, 
Brian Cantwell Smith and Bruno Latour (currently being translated by the 
author).
112 and buried in the past, not yet born in a distant future, or too 
shrouded in vagueness to do otherwise).4 
With objects and ontology predicated on ethics (in Smith’s 
sense), what remains metaphysically indispensable is to give 
room to reference-making. That is, to articulate causally effective 
local encounters with the world with non-causal long-distance 
reference. In other words, what is valued here is less one over-
arching metaphysical category (the One, the transcendental a 
priori, Ideas, the Body and so on) than the room needed to con-
ceive of both proximal connections and distal reference: 
[I]t is essential … and also an anchor of common sense, 
that the multi-various parts of the world do not march in 
lockstep together. The world is fundamentally character-
ized by an underlying flex or slop—a kind of slack or “play” 
that allows some bits to move about or adjust without much 
influencing, and without being much influenced by, other 
bits. … As a contrast, therefore, imagine a world quite unlike 
ours, consisting, … of nothing but an endless series of inter-
locked gears. Suppose … that every gear is constructed so 
as to mesh with one or more immediate neighbors, and 
that the entire gear universe is interconnected, but in such 
a way that it is still possible for them all to be turned … so 
that it does not lock up. Suppose, too, that the gears are 
perfect: no friction, no play between the teeth …. The gear 
world would lack slop. Effects would not dissipate. If one 
gear were to move by even a tiny amount, every other gear 
4 “Perhaps the best way to summarize this is by an analogy. I sometimes think 
of objects, properties, and relations (i.e., conceptual, material ontology) 
as the long-distance trucks and interstate highway systems of intentional, 
normative life. They are undeniably essential to the overall integration of 
life’s practices—critical, given finite resources, for us to integrate the vast 
and open-ended terrain of experience into a single, cohesive, objective 
world. But the cost of packaging up objects for portability and long-distance 
travel is that they are thereby insulated from the extraordinarily fine-
grained richness of particular, indigenous life—insulated from the ineffable 
richness of the very lives they sustain.” (Cantwell Smith, draft, 37).
113in the universe, no matter how far flung, would instantly 
and proportionally be affected. … If the flex were too little … 
the world would lock up like the gear world, and everything 
would be correlated with everything else. Such a world would 
be too rigid, too straight, too stuffy; intentionality would be 
neither possible nor necessary. If the flex were too great, on 
the other hand, it would have the opposite problem: things 
would be too loose, everything would be random, and effect-
transcending coordination would be impossible. Imagine … 
an infinite space randomly occupied by an indefinitely large 
number of particles, all of which drift aimlessly around, none 
of which ever interact. (Cantwell Smith 1998, 199–207)5
Following Smith, we understand non-knowledge as the very 
possibility of a separation from a referent (a possibility that itself 
allows room to be made for “some thing,” for the ontological 
realm of discretized objects). The paradox is then the following:6 
while non-knowledge makes it possible to refer without any 
5 Compare with William James, who put great emphasis on the fact that 
“[n]ot all the parts of the world are united mechanically, for some can 
move without the others moving.” (Some problems of philosophy in James 
1996, 1046). Latour’s project in An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence 
(Latour 2012) has been summarized the following way: “What is at stake: 
to take seriously the first proposition, to civilize the moderns until they 
do not successfully ‘make room’ [for] others. The inquiry indicates that 
the function of its metaphysics is simply to make a place,” commentary 
signed by the GECo (Groupe d’Etudes Constructivistes) on the online version 
of Latour 2012. Available at: http://modesofexistence.org/inquiry/#a=-
SET+DOC+LEADER&c[leading]=DOC&c[slave]=TEXT&i[id]=#doc-257&-
i[column]=DOC&s=0&q=make+room, accessed February 26, 2017. Giving 
room to modes of existence (whether modern or non-modern) is the new 
diplomatic goal of “metaphysics.” Of peculiar interest here is the fact 
that modes of existence themselves are all described by certain kinds of 
continuity and discontinuity (“hiatuses”). This is very much in tune with 
Smith. So much so, in fact, that it generalizes it in a pluralistic fashion. While 
a systematic comparative study of Smith’s and Latour’s positions hasn’t 
been undertaken, it would definitely be a task well worth embarking on.
6 I would like to express thanks to Pierre Livet who read an earlier version of 
this paper and pointed out this paradox. 
114 causal links, unknowledge replaces reference and the referent 
with causal links between actionable traces—despite the fact that 
the relation between such traces and any referent has become an 
“annoying irrelevance.” 
At first glance, unknowledge appears to threaten long-distance 
reference since according to the definition we have adopted it 
no longer defers to the world, preoccupied as it is with its own 
self-centered efficiency. But such a criticism would be mistaken 
if left at that. While unknowledge denotes a peculiar lack of 
awareness of its limits, it is also defined by what it produces, 
namely, “knowledge traces.” In other words, it adds gears where 
there were none, where space used to provide enough room for 
the “world’s flex and slop,” filling in preexisting gaps, favoring 
the multiplication of interlocked gears and short-distance com-
munication to simulate continuity over long-distance reference. 
The strategy adopted is instead one of generalized padding, 
where gears can be endlessly introduced and correlated with 
one another. Therefore, unknowledge also raises ontological 
questions—rather than purely epistemic ones—by threatening 
the middle ground between absence and presence, distance and 
proximity, with its overflowing stuffiness.
The threat posed by abstraction was discussed at the beginning 
of this paper. At this point, the picture becomes more complex. 
Indeed, one must make an additional distinction to properly 
account for the risks induced by unknowledge. Conceptual 
formalization is one form of abstraction. On the other hand, 
digital formalization partakes in abstraction while at the same 
time being very much concrete: actual and not just virtual in the 
strict philosophical sense of these words. So much so that in 
the end unknowledge materializes formal abstractions (which, 
accordingly, are no longer abstractions, strictly speaking). The 
ensuing risk is twofold: a) by adding a layer of connected formal 
traces either “on top” of distal referents or which “stand for” 
those, we may no longer be concerned with what we are not 
locally and causally connected to (which, incidentally, represents 
115most of the world!) and that we can only apprehend through sep-
aration and distal reference—we need to be able to partially dis-
connect ourselves from our local surroundings to get a broader 
grasp of the world; and b) by neglecting the fact that what is 
digitized or materialized is nothing but the representation of an 
abstraction (a referent) that it may never completely exhaust, we 
tend to forget that such formal representations may very well 
misrepresent their referents—as they inevitably do.7
Love and Felicity and Subsistence 
I will address the way these ontological issues manifest 
themselves concretely by looking at the example of love, as 
studied by Eva Illouz in her inquiry on how new digital life shapes 
our most intimate relationships.8 Illouz identifies that romantic 
encounters become increasingly saturated by knowledge 
practices. Thanks to the generalization of online profiles and the 
metadata they contain, knowledge’s role has gone awry, oblit-
erating, as she puts it, other types of relations and reshuffling the 
boundaries between proximity and distance (an ontological feat 
of no little consequence, as we have seen).
Nowhere else is the subtle dialectic between absence and 
presence, distance and proximity, more at play than in the 
phenomenon called “love.” It is not surprising then that 
unbalancing this relation with knowledge (under the guise of 
unknowledge) should put it at risk. Before intimacy grew to 
become a norm, we had never known that much about our love 
interests. Additionally, before the advent of digital cultures, social 
7 P. Livet understands what Smith treats as abstractions as a virtual element 
of a specific ontological kind. I am with him there but cannot discuss this 
point much further. 
8 Her presentation at the Centre for Digital Cultures (CDC) during the winter 
semester, dedicated to non-knowledge and entitled “Knowing way too 
much… Love, Therapy, Technology,” is available online: https://vimeo.
com/153692828, accessed February 28, 2017.
116 networks, online profiles and the like, we never knew that much 
about our potential love interests ahead of encountering them. 
It could be assumed that the boundaries of personhood in a 
relationship have by and large been displaced. While profiles do 
seem to provide accurate (if coarse) knowledge, making visible 
“who” we are by maintaining the boundaries of our identity, what 
in fact happens is that they delegate (outsource, really) what was 
previously left to chance encounters to algorithms that calculate 
our best match. 
Of course, pretending that love owes nothing to chance is not 
entirely new either. Sociology, for one, is a discipline that literally 
saw its mission (as opposed to novel writing for instance) as the 
shedding of light onto the social dynamics underneath the most 
intimate and private phenomena, including lovers’ attraction. It 
held dear and strived to uncover the unseen determinants at play 
behind the curtain. And it was correct in its own right, of course. 
There’s no denying that love might not escape (at least some 
measure of) determinism. 
We should nonetheless pay heed to a paramount difference 
between these two cases: while sociologists did provide statis-
tical conclusions in favor of their claims, no one ever (mis)took 
them as spiritual advisers. In a sense, so much has happened 
with the advent of social networks and dating websites. Filling in 
innumerable fields on a daily basis means people become both 
providers and consumers of the (un)knowledge thus produced 
about themselves. Whereas sociologists’ scientific take on love 
used to be discussed mainly among peers or an educated reader-
ship with an interest in the discipline, it may be said to have now 
infused many, if not most, of our daily transactions, and what is 
more, in a degraded state.
Then again, such a move might be readily welcomed. Aren’t 
relationships, now that we can mimic the behaviors and 
functional possibilities of connected objects (especially the local-
ization bit and the availability of “leaky” knowledge traces), the 
117better for it? After all, no philosophical talk will likely dispel the 
belief that cheating is cheating and that cell phones (undoubtedly 
the Internet of Thing’s first citizen) do provide an efficient way 
to learn the truth in this matter. Must we eventually backtrack 
on the criticism of unknowledge if deferring to the world means 
deferring to such simple truths?
The point is rather that deferring to the world might precisely 
mean something else, at least as far as love is concerned. 
Bruno Latour (2012) suggests that we adopt a pluralistic view on 
metaphysics so as to give space to phenomena that are amenable 
to specific felicitous or infelicitous conditions. Going back to 
Agre’s remark, we may begin to understand why digitality is by 
no means harmless. Digital tools do promise transparency. It is 
all too easy then to treat love as demanding it. Paying heed to the 
felicitous conditions of love should, however, advise otherwise. 
Indeed, the latter may lie less in the search for truth (or 
knowledge) than in love’s own subsistence; a matter of delicate, 
fine-spun dialectic between proximity and distance, presence 
and absence, knowledge and non-knowledge, put at risk when 
(un)knowledge takes over in its “profusing transparency” (talk of 
“transparency” bears witness to an interesting choice of words, 
as the immediate danger is either to be blinded by the abundance 
of digital traces of all kinds or to treat them indeed as transparent 
intermediaries). However, in order to properly understand the 
key role played by non-knowledge with regards to love one has to 
overcome unknowledge first. 
Not unlike love, art also has its own conditions of felicity. Subsis-
tence, then, may adequately translate into being able to listen to 
the call of the work of art (to speak Etienne Souriau’s language).9 
And that might imply an obfuscation of part of the creative 
process if needs be. Immediately, the question arises, “does it 
amount to lying?” Whenever truth is equated with transparency, 
with little or no regard for the phenomenon at stake, the answer 
9 See Souriau 2009 and 1955.
118 is yes. By contrast, when subsistence, understood as the con-
tinuation of the phenomenon at stake, takes priority, the answer 
shall be a clear “no,” knowledge at that point being subservient 
to care. This is reminiscent of “ethnographic refusal,” a decision 
not to write about a subject matter to avoid putting it at risk, 
being exploitative or unhelpful (among the many traps that await 
researchers in that field).10
Latour himself expresses the need for a “crooked language” in 
politics as well:
[N]othing is more important for this inquiry than to find 
the difference between truth and falsity in politics. If there 
is one area where our inheritance has to be revisited, it is 
surely that of the hopes placed in politics and its capacity for 
extension. What will we have to do to situate appropriately 
crooked speaking once again at the center of our civility 
as the only means to collect the collective, and above all 
to universalize it? Does the Circle give us a thread like 
Ariadne’s that will let us speak here again of the rational 
and the irrational but in a well-curved way, that is, in its own 
language, provided that we don’t seek to judge it with the 
help of a different touchstone? We need this thread, for how 
could we stand up straight on the agora, with no hope of 
help from any Science and yet without giving up on reason, 
about controversial issues that have taken on the dimensions 
of the planet and in the heat of a crowd that now numbers in 
the billions? (Latour 2012)11
10 A note on ethnographic refusal with a bibliography was recently published 
online: https://discardstudies.com/2016/08/08/ethnographic-refusal-a-how-
to-guide/, accessed February 28, 2017.
11 Online notes available at: http://modesofexistence.org/
inquiry/?lang=en#b[chapter]=#29&b[subhead ing]=#541&a=-
SET+TEXT+LEADER&c[leading]=TEXT&c[slave]=VOC&s=0&q=nothing+is+m
ore+important+for+this+inquiry+than+to+find+the+difference, accessed 
February 28, 2017.
119Contrary to Latour, I would not restrict such a crooked language 
to politics. Or rather, to put it more succinctly, this kind of 
language can be seen as the political answer provided to a 
broader issue. With respect to non-knowledge, we have come 
to give precedence to subsistence over those truths obtained 
by producing oversimplifications.12 Subsistence requires care13 
and a hospitable middle ground, whether in politics, love, or 
the arts. Unknowledge, by contrast, unable as it is to defer to 
the world even as it conveys trite truths, striving to unbalance 
the middle ground, sorely lacks this aspect. As Agre puts it, “a 
reformed technical practice [should] employ the tools of critical 
inquiry to engage in a richer and more animated conversation 
with the world” (1995). For this conversation with the world to be 
genuinely fruitful, non-knowledge should be neither overlooked 
nor undermined. 
Conclusion 
Crooked language is no enemy of reason, yet neither is it to be 
understood in terms of truth or falsity as science understands 
it. As we have seen, non-knowledge, unlike knowledge (and 
to a lesser extent unknowledge, which is not just a degraded 
epistemic norm but also has an ontological dimension), is less an 
epistemic value than a metaphysical middle ground allowing for 
12 “Add some transparency, some truth (still in the sense of Double Click), 
and you still get only dissolution, stampede, the dispersal of that very 
agora in which the fate of all categories is judged.” http://modesof-
existence.org/inquiry/?lang=en#b[chapter]=#13&b[subheading]=#211&a=-
SET+TEXT+LEADER&c[leading]=TEXT&c[slave]=VOC&s=0&q=agora, accessed 
February 26, 2017.
13 This was tacitly acknowledged in a recent tweet published on the AIME (An 
Inquiry into Modes of Existence) account: “It ’s one hypothesis of AIME that 
beings of [POL] are so fragile that their mode of existence may disappear 
entirely through lack of care.” Available at: https://twitter.com/AIMEproject/
status/756786152548409344, accessed February 26, 2017. That the 
generalization is not made outside [POL] is a testament of Latour’s rather 
complex relationship to care.
120 the subsistence of a multiplicity of generic phenomena according 
to their own requirements (akin to Latour’s modes of existence). 
William James himself noted that “the same thing … can belong 
to many systems, as when a man is connected with other objects 
by heat, by gravitation, by love, and by knowledge [my emphasis]” 
(1996, 1048). Tellingly, knowledge in his enumeration was but one 
among many such systems. 
James also noticed our relentless propensity to add what he 
called new “systems of concatenation”: “We ourselves are con-
stantly adding to the connection of things, organizing labor 
unions, establishing postal consular, mercantile, railroad, tele-
graphs, colonial, and other systems that bind us and things 
together in ever wider reticulations” (ibid.). It is somewhat ironic 
that we only have a negative expression like “non-knowledge” 
at our disposal to refer to the multiplicity of these systems of 
concatenations minus one... Such is the overwhelming weight 
of unknowledge today: no longer a norm but rather a system of 
concatenations that not only overshadows and twists others but 
eventually jeopardizes their conditions of subsistence.
I would like to thank the CDC for the kind invitation to be 
involved in the semester dedicated to non-knowledge as a 
fellow in November 2015, and to express particular gratitude to 
Martina Leeker.
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Unknowing and Silent 
Knowledge as a Challenge: 
Iconic, Performative, and 
Material Perspectives
Christoph Wulf
Unknowing plays an important role in anthro-
pology, philosophy, and cultural studies. Here, 
unknowing is often not considered negative but is 
deemed a constitutive condition of knowledge. In 
historical anthropology, we have picked up on this 
insight and understanding and, following Helmuth 
Plessner, assume that the human being must be 
understood as “homo absconditus,” which itself is 
never completely recognizable. Following the “lin-
guistic turn” in the final quarter of the twentieth 
century, there have been several “turns” in the 
cultural sciences (humanities), in which dealing 
with the limits of knowledge and tacit knowledge 
play an important role.
124 Unknowing as a Condition of the Humanities 
Unknowing plays an important role in anthropology, philosophy, 
and cultural studies. Here, unknowing is often not considered 
negative but is deemed a constitutive condition of knowledge. At 
the end of his life, Socrates said that he knew virtually nothing. 
He was, however, aware of this and that the highest form of 
knowledge lay therein. In historical anthropology, we have picked 
up on this insight and understanding and, following Helmuth 
Plessner, assume that the human being must be understood 
as “homo absconditus,” which itself is never completely rec-
ognizable. The concept of “deus absconditus,” the unfathomable 
God, was coined in theology to express the inscrutability of God. 
According to Nietzsche’s God is dead declaration, the question 
arises as to what extent the human being has replaced God 
and whether it is time to clarify in the humanities that humans 
are themselves unfathomable, that unknowing is a constitutive 
condition of human life, human insight, and historical-cultural 
anthropology. 
This is all the truer if we assume that it is not the responsibility 
of science to reduce complexity, but to increase complexity by 
acquiring new knowledge. Ultimately, with every realization, the 
number of new questions generated as a result grows to the 
extent that cognitive processes never come to an end. There-
fore, in the humanities, there is talk of the contingent character 
of human life and knowledge. Contingency clarifies the short-
coming of ideas, which accept gradual advance and are not open 
to the emergent character of knowledge, limiting its foreseea-
bility and calculability. While in the humanities today talk is often 
about contingency and contingent knowledge, in many parts 
of the natural sciences, technical sciences, and social sciences, 
this dimension of knowledge is actively hidden. Uninterrupted 
knowledge gain and success are lauded, and thus social rec-
ognition and financing for further research are received. Science 
is rewarded for providing assurance and upholding the prospect 
125of limiting uncertainty and the fundamental contingency of 
knowledge.
The emphasis on the fundamental non-overcoming of unknowing 
in the humanities is contrary to science’s legitimizing raison 
d’être: that it can recognize and diminish the unknown. 
Particularly in quantitative research, and above all in its official 
and political use and reception, a “gestus” (gesture, manner) is 
revealed that assumes the world is recognizable as a whole and 
is, as a consequence, controllable and can be improved. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the positivism dispute had 
already raised sustained doubt about the complacent reliance 
on knowledge. In critical rationalism, advanced by Karl Popper 
and others, knowledge was considered scientific if it followed a 
single method believed to be correct from a normative viewpoint. 
Mandatory use of the correct method, irrespective of the content, 
ensured the scientific character of research results. The method 
guarantees, through the reproducibility of its results, validity or 
truth and thus its scientific character. Thomas Kuhn (1962) raised 
doubts about this view with reference to the significance of 
paradigm shifts for the acquisition of new scientific knowledge. 
Even more fundamental were the objections from the 
representatives of the Critical Theory against the reduction of 
science to methodology. They also criticized the development 
of research issues and the question of how the research results 
could be used on a social level, stating that it should not be part 
of science. According to this view, only the formation of “mid-
range theories,” which are necessary for empirical research, 
should be considered theory formation. Theories that claim to 
have a broader reach and explanatory power do not belong to 
science according to this opinion: they are to be viewed as part 
of philosophy. Quantitative empirical research, therefore, grew 
strongly in subsequent years, bolstered by an alliance with pol-
itics and business. 
126 Other approaches in scientific development, such as the critique 
of the Frankfurt School of capitalism and neoliberalism, are 
almost forgotten today. Key concepts of Critical Theory such as 
“enlightenment” and “emancipation,” “reification” and “critique,” 
“sociability” and “reflexivity,” “theory” and “practice,” have 
disappeared from the vocabulary of the humanities. In con-
trast to the efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, when it was thought 
much could be overcome with a critique of inadequacies, recent 
decades have shown that critique and reflection are indeed 
important prerequisites for the improvement of social conditions, 
but only contribute towards this improvement to a limited extent. 
In discourses on post-modernity, doubt was repeatedly cast on 
the value of the “grand narratives” (Lyotard 1979), which also 
involved the Frankfurt School. Here, there was less doubt about 
the quality of knowledge of the quantitative sciences and their 
explanatory power, i.e., about the scientism of these sciences. 
With reference to the previously mentioned concept of con-
tingency, doubt was raised about the systemization, reliability, 
and coherence of scientific knowledge in the humanities. On 
several occasions, Adorno (1978) drew attention to the fact that 
the enlightening character of scientific knowledge may turn 
into its opposite and that science was in danger of contributing 
to the reification of humans and their relationships with the 
world. Derrida (1972) and others also made clear, using their 
idea of deconstruction, the ways in which strong knowledge and 
recognition are linked to certain conditions. A change in those 
conditions leads to a change in the logic of scientific knowledge. 
It is obvious that dealing with unknowing in these processes is a 
constitutive role.
“Turns” and Knowledge
Following the “linguistic turn” in the final quarter of the twentieth 
century, there have been several “turns” in the cultural sciences 
(humanities), in which dealing with the limits of knowledge and 
127with tacit knowledge play an important role. I am interested in 
key areas described as “iconic,” “performative,” and “material” 
turns. 
The iconic, performative, and material turns and their associated 
perspectives lead to the development of new fields of research 
with new purposes, methods, and results. Within the frame-
work of each perspective, areas can be identified which are 
excluded because of their respective focus and which, although 
they are closely connected to the issues being examined, are 
not addressed. With a focus on images, the iconic and the 
media in the first key area described here, the human body—its 
productions, performances, and movements—as well as the 
materiality of technology and new media, were overlooked. This 
is surprising as performativity also belongs to the conditions of 
images and the media. This changed in the second turn, in which 
the perspectives omitted in the first turn became the focus of 
attention. Although attention was now directed at the body, its 
movements, its productions, and performances, the implicit 
silent knowledge in the body was rarely a subject. Even where 
talk was of practical knowledge, incorporation of the knowledge 
was not, or only to some extent, examined. Only where perfor-
mativity was addressed in connection with mimetic processes did 
the significance of the implicit incorporated knowledge for social 
activities come into view (Wulf 2013). A focus on the materiality 
of media, new technologies, the body, and things in the third 
turn was so important it sparked the question of whether its 
entanglement with the subjectivity of people attracted sufficient 
attention, and if the plurality of the subjects and the effect of this 
perspective on the understanding of materiality in implicit or 
silent knowledge was pushed aside. This meant that the focus on 
the different key areas led to the suppression of other aspects. 
As our study “Global Youth in Digital Trajectories” (Kontopodis, 
Varvantakis, and Wulf 2017)—which was financed by the European 
Union and involved a compilation of six case studies in Germany, 
The Netherlands, Greece, Russia, India, and Brazil on how young 
128 people deal with the digital world—shows, these key areas also 
play a role in the handling of the virtual world. Considering the 
importance of these areas in the humanities I would like to briefly 
describe them and develop some thoughts on the significance 
silent knowledge has here (Kraus et al. 2017). But first of all, some 
thoughts on what I understand by this term.
Silent Knowledge
With the distinction between “Knowing How and Knowing That,” 
Gilbert Ryle had already, in the 1940s, drawn attention to the 
fact that there are different forms of knowledge, of which the 
practical implementations described with a “knowing how” are 
difficult to research (Ryle 1990). With these methods, the focus is 
not on the acquisition of factual knowledge that can be expressed 
linguistically. On the contrary, “knowing how” describes a skill 
that enables the person to act and which is learned in mimetic 
processes by referring to the practices of other people. An 
example of this is rituals. Rituals are not statements, reasons, 
or explanations. They must be staged and performed. The 
knowledge required for rituals is a performative, practical 
knowledge, which differs from the knowledge needed for the 
description, interpretation, and analysis of rituals. “Knowing how” 
is thus a practical knowledge—an incorporated skill that is visible 
in a person’s performance. In mimetic processes today smart-
phones and tablets merge with the body and expand its effects 
beyond tight physical boundaries.
A practice such as driving a car is only learned if the explanation 
of how to learn was understood. But constantly remembering 
this explanation is not necessary to execute the action. An action 
cannot be “skillfully” engaged in as long as this remembering is 
necessary. Once the learning has been incorporated, the person 
has the skill to practice, i.e., to drive a car. Practical skill is thus a 
form of knowledge that requires attention and social recognition. 
Types of practical knowledge are constitutive for many sciences 
129such as medicine, law, and education. In the words of Ryle: 
“Successful practice precedes its actual theory” (Ryle 1990, 33). 
Michael Polanyi, who understands knowledge as an awareness 
and thinking process, as a knowing in action, writes: “I regard 
knowing as an active comprehension of the things known, an 
action that requires skill. Skillful knowing and doing is per-
formed by subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, 
to the shaping of a skillful achievement, whether practical or 
theoretical” (Polanyi 1974, VII). Polanyi indicates that if a person 
points at a wall using their finger and asks someone to look, the 
person looks at the wall and not at the finger, and concludes: 
One way is to look at a thing. This is the way you look at the 
wall. But how is one to describe the way you see my finger 
pointing at the wall? You are not looking at my finger, but 
away from it. I should say that you do not see it as a mere 
object to be examined as such, but as an object having a 
function: the function of directing your attention away from 
itself and at something else. But this is not to say that my 
pointing finger was trying to make you disregard itself. Far 
from it. It wanted to be seen, but to be seen only in order to 
be followed and not in order to be examined. (Polanyi 1977, 
313) 
This is implicit knowledge that the objective of the perception 
reference is the wall at which the finger is pointing and not 
the actual finger, and therefore the focus of awareness to the 
movement, and then to the wall, is required. Polanyi repeatedly 
refers to examples that show what he means by silent knowledge; 
for example, a pianist who if he concentrated on the individual 
movements of his fingers would become paralyzed and unable 
to perform. Using cycling and the balancing it requires, Polanyi 
explains how complex the practices of knowledge are for physical 
skills: “We cannot learn to keep our balance on a bicycle by 
taking to heart that in order to compensate for a given angle of 
imbalance α, we must take a curve on the side of the imbalance, 
130 of which the radius (r) should be proportionate to the square of 
the velocity (ν) over the imbalance: ... Such knowledge is ineffec-
tual, unless known tacitly” (Polanyi 1969, 144). From this consid-
eration, it can be concluded that: “A physical understanding of the 
force fields of the movements cannot obviously help with dealing 
with the somatic-kinaesthetic interplay of forces of balance” 
(Huschka 2017).
What role does silent knowledge now play in the iconic, per-
formative, and material turns and how does it appear together 
with the key areas described by these terms in the digital world? 
The question is complex, and I can only answer it with a first 
approximation. 
Images and Picture Character of the World
Following preliminary work by Marshall McLuhan (1964), Jean 
Baudrillard (1981), and Paul Virilio (1996), who examined the media 
and picture character of new media and emphasized their speed, 
ubiquity, and simulation character, several studies have emerged 
since the 1990s about the theory of the image and imagination. 
These extensive studies clarified that the increase in images as 
a result of media is leading to profound changes in society and 
culture. In addition, there were several studies that presented, in 
detail, the importance of the computer and the internet for the 
development of new forms of communication and aesthetics in 
the globalized world. 
According to Martin Heidegger and others, the growing 
importance of images results from the fact that human beings 
have “extracted” themselves from nature or God’s creations 
and now see the world as an object; the world has become an 
image (Wulf 2014). During this development, the extent to which 
images represent iconic knowledge that can be only inadequately 
recognized using language became clear. In Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing’s interpretation of the statue of Laocoön, the special 
iconic character, which basically distinguishes images and statues 
131from language and narration, takes center stage. In the image, 
there is concentration on a fertile moment. In contrast, an action 
process is presented in a narration. The genesis of an event or 
an action cannot be represented with images. Action is com-
pressed in images; it is implicit, not explicit as it is in narration. 
The image refers to something that can only be represented 
iconically and not narratively, which remains implicit. An inter-
pretation is only possible with the help of language. The image 
“does not reveal” what it may look like; interpretations have only 
limited significance for perception and sensual understanding of 
the image. 
An example: images initiate actions, i.e., can be performative 
and have an implicit knowledge of an action that is represented, 
showing, for example, a schematic drawing in an instruction 
manual for the assembly of the cabinet. Although it only shows 
one part of the assembly—how to join the walls of a cabinet—
the drawing is much more useful than a linguistic description. 
The visual representation contains knowledge in a condensed 
format that is not explicit from a linguistic viewpoint, and is as 
an instruction more effective than an elaborated text. The iconic 
character of the visual representation has implicit knowledge that 
is helpful for the assembly of the cabinet. 
If the world increasingly becomes an image, and image-producing 
media start at an early stage to shape the imaginary world of 
children and young people, then the image becomes a central 
living condition. This is the case especially with the use of smart-
phones, apps, and computers, whose digital image-worlds are 
incorporated through daily use, i.e., they become part of our 
physical existence. We are already familiar with many things 
as images before we encounter them, and then, when we do 
see them, we have no means of knowing to what extent the 
image seen earlier defines our encounter with the real thing. 
If Comenius spoke about the insatiable thirst of young people 
for images, then today the problem is increasingly how we can 
protect ourselves from the plethora of pictures, how we develop 
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incorporate and process them in their iconic character with their 
silent knowledge. 
Performativity: Production and Performance
Initially, many research approaches to the iconic adopted a 
hermeneutical method, but in recent years, interest in the per-
formativity of images and media has increased. This happened 
under the influence of the development of a performative per-
spective in the cultural sciences. In contrast to the hermeneutical 
approach, in which social practices are read as text and the 
interpretation of their significance is foregrounded, now, it is 
about how to envisage and examine the production and per-
formance of the cultural and social. The iconic approach should 
thereby be complemented with a perspective that is present as 
implicit knowledge therein, but which did not play a role in the 
traditional interpretation of the social aspect. The perspective 
that had been implicit in this approach and therefore belonged to 
silent knowledge should now be discovered and developed. Now, 
it is no longer primarily about researching the significance and 
meaning of social and pedagogical actions, but about examining 
how these practices are executed. It then becomes clear that this 
perspective deals with practical knowledge, whose focus is on 
dealing with practices, with physical and social skills. 
This is particularly apparent in the research of the “Berlin Ritual 
and Gesture Study” (Wulf et al. 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2011), 
which examines how people perform rituals, how they produce 
them, and how the ritual act differs in several performances of 
the same production. In contrast to Clifford Geertz, who under-
stands culture as a “montage of texts” (Geertz 1995, 253), here the 
focus is on the actual act, its physical production and perform-
ance, as well as its productive design and layout (Wulf, Göhlich, 
and Zirfas 2001).
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hermeneutical interpretation of the social element, but to 
complement it by shifting the viewpoint. It is less about the 
interpretation of the significance of practices than about the 
production and performance of the act, its physicality, and its 
interactions. The focus is not on an acceptance of a demanding 
interpretation of social practices, but an analysis of the concrete 
conditions of the act. It is “less about underlying issues than the 
phenomenal event, less about the structure and the functions 
than the process, less about the text or symbol than the creation 
of reality” (Wulf and Zirfas 2007, 10). The emphasis is on inter-
action processes and the dynamics of linguistic performances 
and completed actions, as well as the physicality and materiality 
of the social element. 
The objective is to research the modus operandi, the manner, 
the way in which social practices are executed. Insofar as it 
relates to a skill, according to Ryle (1990), this is embedded in 
the silent knowledge of the body. Their institutional and his-
torical-social conditions play an important role here. To examine 
these connections using a conclusive method, ethnographic 
research is required. Here it is necessary to examine the social 
situation in different ways: first, from the perspective of one or 
several observers not involved in the event in a participatory or 
video-supported participatory observation, and second, from 
the subjective perspective of the actors using interviews and 
group discussions. Then both perspectives are interrelated and 
integrated where possible. In this triangulation attempt, the 
difference between knowledge from a third-person perspective 
and knowledge from a first-person perspective is made clear. 
In both forms of knowledge, there is theoretically non-tangible, 
implicit practical knowledge. 
134 Human Beings and Things: The Materiality of 
Educational and Learning Processes
The iconic turn led to the examination of the significance of 
images, immaterial aspects, and digital media for society and 
culture. An anthropological interest in the diversity of images, 
the complexity of imagination, and the social and cultural power 
of the imaginary evolved. At the same time, it became clear how 
central this area is for individual and social activities and what 
role these images play in desire, in feelings, and in actions. In 
the interest of research on performativity, the significance of the 
body, which has been the focus of anthropology since the 1980s, 
was presented. Physical dynamics in social activities, which had 
been overlooked for a long time, were examined. The production 
and performance of senses and the body, and the performativity 
of social practices received attention. The performativity of 
images and media was discovered: a new interest developed in 
the materiality of human interactions, as well as things and their 
socializing effects.
Two developments supported this focus on the material element. 
One led to a discovery of the importance of technical equipment 
and prostheses for the body and the human conception of itself. 
Donna Haraway’s idea of a “cyborg,” a “hybrid of machine and 
organism” (Haraway 1995, 33), became a reflection of this fusion, 
which generated numerous figures and narrations in science 
fiction. Another development was the actor-network theory 
(Latour 2000), which clarified that not only subjects played a role 
in social activities, as was long suggested by the agency dis-
course, but that social activities are effected by a range of factors 
in which the materiality of things plays an important role. The aim 
of this theory is to deal with the dichotomy between human being 
and thing, nature and human being, subject and object, and to 
reduce this dichotomy where possible. The comparison of human 
being and thing was no longer appropriate; it was thwarted, 
and the way new perspectives might arise for the relationship 
135between human beings and the world was examined. In Bruno 
Latour’s “symmetrical anthropology” an attempt is made to 
overcome the sharp distinction between human being and thing. 
The links between humans and things are analyzed. Things are 
understood as being a result of human productivity and as a 
consolidation of cultural development. When dealing with things, 
complex historical processes may be experienced in a condensed 
form. 
Today computers, tablets, cell phones, etc., are part of people. 
Without them, everyday life in most parts of the world is vir-
tually impossible. In the digital native generation, these devices 
or their effects are incorporated from early childhood and are 
thus part of everyday life. They are used to expand and intensify 
contact with the world. These devices take on the burden of 
memory and make it possible to store and share large quantities 
of data. Apps facilitate orientation in the world and solutions to 
everyday problems. SatNav relieves us of searching; it suggests 
reliability and orientation. Without SatNav, we would be helpless 
and disoriented. The symbiosis between machine and human 
being is likely to reach new levels in the driverless cars of the 
future. It relieves human beings of driving, but also increases our 
dependency on machines. Machines are part of our activities, 
our body, our imagination and world of ideas. For a long time 
now, they have no longer been external, on the outside; they are 
part of us, meaning a demarcation between them and human 
individuals is barely possible. 
Latour refers to the fact that “each thing that changes a given 
situation, by making a difference, can be an actor” or an “actant” 
(Latour 2007, 123). The result is that where human and non-
human agents are combined, original “action programmes” 
(Latour 2000, 216) are changed; new social practices thus evolve 
such as people meeting up at extremely short notice via cell 
phones. Many new action programmes can substitute a human 
actor with a thing; answering machines are a good example. In 
addition to this “delegation” (Latour 2000, 227), Latour also makes 
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is made up of many such hybrid actors (“blackboxing,” ibid., 
227), meaning there is a “need for an unbiased, rigorous recon-
struction of the historically developed links between people and 
things” (Nohl and Wulf 2013, 6). To research these links, historical 
and empirical studies of the materiality and the handling of the 
artifacts are required. In addition, historical analyses and ethno-
graphical research are required.
In the humanities, there is a reception of the confrontation not 
only with the materiality of the human body and social practices, 
but also with the materiality of things (Nohl and Wulf 2013). 
Mimetic processes play an important role in these forms of cul-
tural learning. Using the example of Walter Benjamin’s “Berlin 
Childhood around 1900” and its reconstruction of childhood 
(Benjamin 1980), it becomes clear how the world of his parents’ 
home is revealed to the young Benjamin in mimetic processes. In 
these processes, he incorporates the materiality of the spaces, 
rooms, streets, houses, and things. He shows how the rooms 
and things initiate feelings, how his world as a child is magically 
set up, how he imitates a windmill with his body, and thus 
experiences the machine character through his own body. In 
corners, hidden spots, dens, bays, cupboards, dressers, sills, etc., 
Benjamin feels the world of things; he has tactile experiences, 
and absorbs odors, which are incorporated in mimetic movement 
(Gebauer and Wulf 1998). The things are not lifeless. They look 
back, they make sounds, they smell, and convey tactile expe-
riences. In mimetic processes, the objects and noises from early 
childhood are collected in the “deeper self,” from where they can 
be recalled later by means of optical or acoustic stimuli. In the act 
of remembering, there is a mimetic reference to the things, the 
material of the memory. The mimetic ability of the child to relate 
to the objects of the world, to create something similar, to read 
them, returns to language and writing according to Benjamin’s 
view. In the process the “mimetic ability,” which was previously 
the “basis of the vision,” creates in language and writing the 
137“complete archive of nonsensuous similarity.” The similarity and 
resemblance create central constellations through which the 
relationship with things and itself gradually forms. The processes 
described here belong to a large extent to the area of silent 
knowledge, of which we only have a rudimentary awareness. 
The materiality of things has a demanding character. Many 
social and cultural products are manufactured and arranged so 
that they lure children into engaging with them and handling 
them in a certain way. Often a social or economic staging or 
production underlies the way these products appear. Things are 
also staged in the area of pedagogy. In Emile from 1762, Rous-
seau talks about pedagogy from things. The things are to ask 
children to handle them in a certain manner. Their demanding 
character “opposes the free availability of functional objects by 
that alone, through which the subject is disposed, because the 
request pre-empts him” (Stieve 2013, 92). No more or no less do 
the things themselves request an understanding of a cultural 
order, as their meaning and relevance can be read from them 
immediately. “The purpose only dominates in the everyday, brief 
or fleeting use of things and the thing is overlooked … in favor of 
a function being implemented” (Selle and Boehe 1986, 11). Many 
contributions from early childhood and research on childhood 
demonstrate how objects initiate and control learning processes. 
Today, things are also having effects on people, in particular in 
and beyond the digital world. As they take on the form of images 
here, they may also appear—free of their materiality—in com-
pletely new combinations, possible only in the digital medium. 
A new world of things in the form of images emerges and leads 
to the development of iconic materiality in people’s imagination. 
The processes implemented here also create new forms of iconic 
knowledge of the body, which becomes part of the everyday 
living environment of people. 
138 Outlook
With the focus on unknowing and silent knowledge, a research 
field for the cultural sciences is proposed in which important 
results from the “turns” of recent years can be merged. In this 
connection, an extension and enhancement of practical and 
performative-related perspectives is required, and a willing-
ness to develop new methods of access and forms of experience 
and reflection for dealing with practice in collaboration with 
digital media. Researching social practices and the implicit silent 
knowledge therein from the perspectives of the actor-network 
theory, imagination, performativity, and iconic materiality in the 
virtual world is a challenge from a conceptual and methodological 
viewpoint.
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On Knowing Too Much: 
Technologists’ Discourses 
Around Online Anonymity
Paula Bialski
This chapter focuses on the way technologists 
approach the data they collect, manage, and 
analyze; at times feeling they can know too much 
and see too much about individual users, at 
times feeling that they know too little, leaving 
them hungry for gathering more data. Based on 
preliminary research in San Francisco among 
data brokers, hackers, activists, privacy teams at 
large corporations, app developers, bloggers, and 
cryptographers, I create a typology of characters 
that handle data. Using the metaphor of weaving, 
I imagine data as threads that make up a fabric. 
Using this metaphor, I ask: Who collects these 
threads? Who gathers them, weaves them, and who 
cuts them? How are data gathered and treated?
144 Introduction
There are moments in life when we overhear conversations we do 
not particularly want to hear. I was sitting on the late train coming 
home from Lüneburg to Hamburg—with nobody in the train car 
other than myself, my partner, who was asleep, and two Polish 
thugs in their thirties. Speaking in Polish, thinking nobody would 
overhear them, they started discussing, at normal volume, a drug 
heist they were planning in which they wanted to transport five 
kilograms of a drug to Sweden by ship using a smuggler. Using my 
keen understanding of Polish, I started collecting items of infor-
mation: five kilograms, a boat to Sweden, thousands of euros, 
endless questions about how to find a smuggler that looked 
right, that police would not expect, how to not get caught. She 
should be a small chick. Or a fag. Or a couple. Who would do it? 
Who could they take advantage of? Even before their sexist and 
homophobic remarks, I thought to myself, “This has gone too far. 
I know too much.” The train was nearing Hamburg, and I froze, 
thinking, “What to do now with all this knowledge?” A huge part 
of me wanted to track them with my iPhone—snap a few photos, 
record their conversation, and email the information to the 
Hamburg police, citizen’s arrest style. Another part of me didn’t 
want to track and trace them. Why should I be the one with the 
power to reveal who they were, just because I had this informa-
tion? Their lack of knowledge of my surveillance of them deemed 
my tracking practices unjust. Should I strip these two of their 
intentions and freedoms to disassociate from this drug deal? My 
partner woke up, and after I told him what was happening, he 
started getting angry. These guys were being sexist? His chest 
puffed up, he turned around and started glaring at them. They 
barely noticed. The train stopped at Hamburg’s central station 
and he stepped out of the train behind them. They still didn’t 
notice. While the story ended with the two thugs leaving the 
station unaware of our existence, I still couldn’t help thinking—
what do people do when they really know too much, and what are 
the affective dimensions among people who know too much? 
145Each and every person has a particular form or pattern of life. As 
Gregoire Chamayou explained in Drone Theory, our daily actions 
are repetitive, and our behavior has certain regularities. “For 
example, you rise at roughly the same hour and regularly make 
the same journey to work or elsewhere. You frequently meet 
up with the same friends in the same places. If you are placed 
under surveillance, it is possible to record all your movements 
and establish a spatiotemporal map of all your usual doings. 
Furthermore, by intercepting your telephone calls, observers 
can superimpose your social network upon this map, determine 
which are your personal links, and calculate the importance of 
each one in your life” (Chamayou 2015, 75). As an American army 
manual explains: “While the enemy moves from point to point, 
surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. 
Connections between those sites and persons to the target are 
built, and nodes in the enemy’s network emerge” (Chamayou 
2015, 76).
These practices, behaviors, daily patterns of doing things are all 
identifying markers of who we are. Today’s digital infrastructures 
of collection, transmission, analysis, and presentation have made 
continuous data-mining possible (Couldry and Powell 2014)—con-
tinuous mining of what makes up “us.” As one of the technologists 
I met during my fieldwork in San Francisco explained to me, “You 
would be surprised how unique you really are. All this stuff about 
us being the same is all wrong when it comes to a data perspec-
tive.” It is very easy to find that one particular 30-year-old man, 
born on April 16, who is exactly six meters tall and goes to work at 
eight in the morning.
Many everyday activities now produce data without requiring 
human meaning or construction (or even basic consent). Along 
with the innovation of sensor networks, individuals started pro-
ducing not “‘content’ composed of messages containing intrinsic 
or constructed meaning, but mere data—temperature readings, 
status updates, location coordinates, tracks, traces and check-
ins” (Couldry and Powell 2014, 3). Not one of these individual data 
146 types is necessarily meaningful in itself—but taken together, 
either through aggregation, correlation, or calculation, such data 
provide large amounts of information. “We are living through 
a transformation of governance—both its mechanisms and 
reference-points—which is likely to have profound implications 
for practical processes of government and everyday understand-
ings of the social world” (Couldry and Powell 2014, 1).
To tackle this issue, Couldry and Powell explained that emerging 
cultures of data collection deserve to be examined in a way that 
foregrounds the agency and reflexivity of individual actors as well 
as the variable ways in which power and participation are con-
structed and enacted. While I agree with this statement in that 
it calls to re-evaluate tensions between structure and agency, 
plus control and resistance of the actor within our data-driven 
environment, the “actor” or “data subject” often points inquiry 
more towards the “user” and less at what is happening behind 
the screen, within the bodies and minds of the technologists who 
gather, operate and analyze our data. When Beer (2009, 999) 
noted that sociology must also “focus … on those who engage 
with the software in their everyday lives,” I would add that soci-
ology must also focus on the way in which software engineers, 
system admins, and data analysts also envision the everyday 
lives of users—thus creating a more open inquiry into what types 
of decision are made, what types of battle are played out, and 
what obstacles exist in implementing technology that influences 
our everyday lives. As I will explore in this paper, technologists 
think about the data they collect, manage, and analyze—at times 
feeling they can know too much and see too much, at times 
feeling that they know too little, leaving them hungry for more. 
These technologists operating drones or the analysts in San 
Francisco are the ones who see our patterns of life. Under-
standing their bird’s eye view of us helps us think about their 
agency, which is in itself “fundamental to thinking about the dis-
tribution of data power” (Kennedy et al. 2015, 2). In order to think 
147through these two dimensions—agency and data power—my 
research focuses on one key problem today: anonymity.
Bachmann et al. (2014), drawing from Strathern’s “Cutting the 
Network” (1996), have suggested that if you want to under-
stand anonymity, you have to start conceptualizing it as the act 
of making cuts in identifying markers. To engage in a form of 
anonymity—such as facelessness, namelessness, or pseudonym-
ity—means that one “cuts” these potentially identifying markers 
of individuality and difference from a person. “Genuine gains and 
losses of anonymity occur when a second party links, or fails to 
link, personal information with the person to whom it belongs” 
(Ponnesse 2013, 344).
This process of linking and de-linking is, according to Ponnesse, 
“the result of a specific exercise of control” (2013, 344). Because 
contemporary societies are increasingly based on networked 
information and infrastructures, we are facing new questions 
of how networks of information, properties, and people can be 
linked or de-linked in order to produce, maintain, abandon or 
modify anonymity—and who holds that control. 
These cuts are today assisted or fully brokered by 
specific technologies, or specific persons. When these cuts 
happen—preventing one piece of information from reaching 
another party (be it a person or server)—anonymity is being 
played out. A cut could be made by side A of the anonymous 
interaction, side B of the anonymous interaction, or both, but it 
is also increasingly other actors who are influencing this cutting 
moment: for example, system admins, privacy teams, and 
data analysts. So rather than focusing on the way in which the 
“user” makes cuts in potentially identifying markers of their own 
individuality and difference, and rather than focusing on how 
the “user” creates situational, relational, and partial forms of 
un-knowability, invisibility, and un-trackability—I wish to focus 
on people like the drone operator in Chamayou’s story, or the 
technologist I interviewed in San Francisco. For a number of 
148 complex reasons relating to both the material structure and the 
socio-economic system within which the technologist operates, 
they are at times a powerful, and at times a powerless, mediating 
agent in how forms of anonymity become transformed. More-
over, the “technologist” is not just one person—each has their 
own different agenda. My interest in understanding them—and 
not the user—also stems from understanding and unpacking 
the “black box” (Star 1992) of how they often gather and know 
our “patterns of life,” unbeknownst to us. 
In order to explore these characters, and how they come to “know 
too much,” I will do a few things in this paper: 
Firstly, I will introduce the method in my work, which creates a 
typology of “characters who know too much.” These are the data 
scientists, technologists, system admins, cryptographers, and 
app developers who come from various fields and dimensions of 
the tech industry. Some work for large corporations, some are 
creating their own start-ups. The reason I create these Weberian 
ideal types is not only to synthesize and explain the various 
characters and ideologies of the people who “know too much,” 
but also to camouflage the identity of the subjects I interviewed—
focusing less on the person and their identifying markers, and 
more on their affective dimension of handling data. I realize the 
methods of anonymizing data while doing a project on anonymity 
calls for much more explanation, but I will reserve that for 
another paper, and for the sake of time not take it up here. 
Secondly, in order to unpack the actions of these figures who 
“know too much,” I will work with this metaphor of “cutting” 
and liken data collection to textile production. This approach is 
inspired by the likes of Donna Haraway with her metaphors of 
yarn and culture, and more specifically, Janis Jefferies. Jefferies is 
a British artist and theorist who uses the metaphor of textiles to 
produce new knowledge around computing and digital technol-
ogy. She suggests we focus on a material knowledge afforded by 
textiles, and pattern specifically, where surfaces of patterning 
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textured ( Jefferies 2012). In that vein, I imagine data as threads 
that make up a fabric. Using this metaphor, I ask: Who collects 
these threads? Who gathers them, weaves them, and who cuts 
them? How are data gathered and treated? What types of scissors 
make these cuts? Are they sharp, do they make clean, indiscern-
able cuts, or are they dull, leaving behind scars and shreds when 
cutting? Who is the seamstress or tailor that holds the scissors 
in this cut? Do some hold the scissors, but not make any cuts at 
all? Why is a cut made in the first place? These seamstresses and 
tailors have different agendas, and in this paper I will only begin 
my analysis of the techniques of cutting, showing you who the 
people are who know too much, and how they deal with what 
they know.
Introduction to Methods
The fieldwork for this study was conducted for a larger project 
titled “Reconfiguring Anonymity—Contemporary Forms of 
Reciprocity, Identifiability, and Accountability in Transformation.” 
This three-year project, which began in August 2015, is a trans-
disciplinary endeavor bringing together social anthropologists, 
sociologists, media scientists, and artists to produce new insights 
into regimes of maintaining, modifying, or abandoning anonym-
ity in contemporary, hybrid online-offline worlds. 
I spent nearly two months in San Francisco in August 2015, 
and during this time I interviewed hackers, activists, privacy 
teams at large corporations, app developers, bloggers, and 
cryptographers. In total, I conducted 20 in-depth interviews that 
lasted from half an hour to a number of days. I also conducted 
one focus group with the privacy team of a browser provider, 
attended tech privacy meetups, and gave a public lecture (at the 
Wikimedia Foundation). This preliminary research then led me to 
participate in conferences and workshops for technologists, such 
as the “European Workshop for Trust and Identity” in Vienna in 
150 December 2016, which brought together technologists working on 
various topics of transorganizational trust and identity matters.
My interviews were unstructured, and I found my contacts mainly 
through “hanging out” and asking my interviewees who to talk to 
next. Our discussions would be mainly around the way in which 
these actors treat data and the user’s personhood, and the tools 
being developed to help anonymize the user, as well as to help 
store and encrypt data. We also discussed the future for anonym-
ity or pseudonymity on the net. 
Based on this fieldwork, I began seeing conflicts and con-
gruencies in the way in which these technologists or data brokers 
handled, exchanged, and ethically approached personal data. 
In this paper, I will limit my ideal types to three “Information 
Tailors”: aggregators, allocators, and analysts. While this paper 
marks merely the beginning of my analysis, I think these first 
three “ideal types” can help us think through the distribution of 
data power and the agency and reflexivity of the technologist in 
knowing and un-knowing information linked to individual persons 
while handing data. Again, to help visualize this process, I will 
liken data collection to textile production. 
The Information Tailors
The Aggregator
These agents collect, log, and store data from users. They are 
a human-machine hybrid. They can be a technical mechanism, 
like a data packet storage system, which, crudely speaking, 
collects data packets from any information transferred from 
one IP address and stores it on a server. Data aggregation is a 
central structure of the net. Data aggregators can be found all 
over the net, from Google and online dating websites to small 
apps. When it comes to knowing too much, data aggregators are 
the ones who gather and prepare the data—or to use the fabric 
metaphor—gather tens, thousands, millions, billions of threads 
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(IOI), and they are combed, separated, and directed towards 
one server, or data store, or another. While aggregators do not 
necessarily “know” too much, they collect and log a multitude of 
data in order to create more knowledge for the users and their 
platform and product developers. 
As one of the data aggregators who was building his own app 
mentioned, “Humans are giving up their privacy in order to 
engage in all sorts of beneficial practices (e.g., quantified-self 
apps),” and as an app designer, he decides which exact data 
needs to be aggregated, based on the premise of the app (e.g., 
a running app would aggregate the user’s running speed and 
frequency, their running route, etc.). 
This app designer felt that the more data we aggregate, the 
better—explaining data as a helpful, global brain. He stated: 
“With any system, once you start recording it, it exists some-
where. So the question is rather, do I trust the overall system 
to look out for my own interests? And if I don’t, how hard am 
I willing to work to make sure it does? Humans who engage in 
various practices that they hope is kept private or anonymous 
should not think about disengaging from sharing this infor-
mation, but must help optimize a central system that can act as 
a reputation system, but also must collect and protect its user 
data.” Returning to our tailoring metaphor, this app designer was 
excited to see more data, do more with personal data, while at 
the same time expressing his general feeling that those giving up 
their data should trust people like him who thread their data and 
store it—promising users that he can be trusted to encrypt this 
data and store it in the right, secure place.
Yet not all data aggregators have the same vision, that “having 
and collecting more is better.” In a lecture given by an operating 
system developer and system admin, trying to motivate his 
fellow technologists, he suggested they should “aggregate less” 
by “logging less.” As a background for those who are not familiar 
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ogist explained: “Logs are produced by networked services,” 
e.g., a system administrator must log for debugging and have an 
audit trail and usability studies (how a website gets used), which 
is useful for analytics. The data that’s being logged cover many 
areas, but in particular, he said, “there are some details which 
are more identifiable that produce these patterns of information 
that can be used about someone, but maybe that won’t be used 
by that person. So IP addresses, who logged into a machine, 
there are mail headers that get logged, there are cryptographic 
parameters that get logged, there is a whole bunch of different 
stuff that creates finger-printable trails in these data sets.” 
“Logging less” is part of the practice among system admins and 
information scientists called “data minimization.” It is a theoret-
ical approach that originated in the 1980s along with networked 
infrastructure and information sciences, and is now seemingly 
only promoted among “identity management” activists who make 
it their business to think through personal identity protection and 
data management. Information scientists Pfitzmann and Hansen 
explained that this approach “means that first of all, the pos-
sibility to collect personal data about others should be mini-
mized. Next within the remaining possibilities, collecting personal 
data should be minimized. Finally, the length of time collected 
personal data is stored should be minimized” (Pfitzmann and 
Hansen 2010, 6). 
One aggregator explained: “By default, not even intentionally, 
we collect data, if we do nothing the data gets stored. But who is 
allowed to store the data? Deleting is also a conscious decision. 
And there is also a responsibility issue—who is deciding to delete 
what? There is an awareness problem.”
Speaking passionately, he said, 
I think it ’s worth thinking about this—people often don’t 
make this simple realization: if somebody is trying to get data 
about somebody else, from you, there are lots of different 
153ways you can resist them getting that data from you. But the 
simplest way to resist is to not have that data. It ’s a super 
stupid thing to come to, but that is the easiest way to resist 
giving data away to someone else. Just don’t have it.
While I do not have time here to explain all the variations of 
data aggregators, their ideology and agendas, the two I have 
mentioned show that both sparsely knitted and thickly woven 
threads of data are in play. The technologists I mentioned favored 
sparse threads of data out of fear that these threads will fall into 
the wrong hands. The app developer believed that thickly woven 
threads would be more useful in making better-quality garments 
and that trusting the tailor and his technologies will help users 
share more data, in turn allowing the technologists to know more 
about the user’s patterns of life. 
The Allocator
In the game of “knowing too much” about the subject, data 
allocators are the actors who allocate which threads go into 
which fabrics. Allocators are usually the privacy teams in 
companies—the intermediary between the data aggregators, 
collecting the threads, and the data analysts who weave the 
various threads together to make a given cloth. The agenda of 
the allocators is to protect users from “knowing too much” about 
what data the company collects. These allocators think about 
their company’s user, the image of the company, how much can 
be “known,” and how much should be “left unknown” to the 
public. Allocators not only make decisions about what to do with 
the threads being gathered, but about which threads, or items 
of information, to gather in the first place. During my fieldwork, I 
learned that various large companies have entire privacy teams 
that protect the data of users and that these privacy teams act 
as gatekeepers. Smaller apps, where money is still scarce and 
the teams are composed of three to five people rather than a 
few hundred, might not feature a very thorough information 
allocator. One person can act as an allocator, a designer, and a 
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invested in protecting these data is perhaps not as great as in a 
privacy team, where the team’s sole responsibility is guarding 
data. 
One data analyst I spoke to explained their data aggregation 
and data allocation team: “There is room for new tools but at 
the moment a lot of data is just aggregated and not used.” The 
reason it is not being used? The privacy team doesn’t allow them 
to use it. He explained that users must be led to think: “We trust 
the companies that are aggregating this data, that they won’t do 
anything with it that’s too sensitive or gives away our privacy.” 
In this case, the privacy team has to make sure this trust is not 
breached—allocating only a small ration of data to use, not 
allowing the users to know too much about other users. We can 
imagine allocators as gatekeepers in the game of knowing and 
forgetting.
The Analyst
Much as the name suggests, the analyst analyzes information 
about a user. They do so for various reasons—in order to gauge 
the user’s engagement in their product or in order to create a 
new product for their company. The analyst collects various 
pieces of thread, or items of information—made accessible to 
them by the allocator—creates the fabric, and assembles the 
garment. Analysts are at times overwhelmed with the amount 
of data they have and the amount of knowledge they have about 
a user. One analyst at a large social networking platform said, “I 
have more information than you can ever imagine. The amount of 
things I know about the users is insane. I might think ‘Hey, I don’t 
know if I should be tracking this,’ but I see that we have to do it. 
This is something that I have problems with sometimes.”
An analyst has access to the data allocators and they weave the 
threads of data in one way or another to create a certain cloth; 
here meaning a certain function of an app. This same analyst, 
155who described himself as a hippie, also explained his moral 
dilemma: “This is the job you have, to help people make decisions. 
So the more data, the better. But sometimes we also say ‘Why are 
we doing this? The less data, the better.’” This dilemma seemed to 
me to be a dilemma of data power and his feeling of control: on 
the one hand, he was hungry to know more about the user and 
create more features, and on the other, he felt he was invading 
the user’s privacy. 
Another analyst, when speaking about the critique of big data 
and surveillance, lamented that “full anonymity will not give us 
precise enough data.” What he meant by this statement is that 
data security means often having less data, deleting it, or storing 
it securely. But in order to make systems faster, provide more 
features, and make these systems more usable, he has to have 
more data, and know more about users. This is the usability-data 
security tension. “How do we prioritize somebody’s need for 
anonymity over the functionality of a system? Those who design 
and implement products that deal with the user’s privacy often 
want to do their job well, and in order to do so, need to have the 
most data possible” (data analyst, San Francisco, August 2015). 
This moral dilemma is not one that happens on an everyday basis 
for these technologists. As another analyst said, “Those who 
design and implement anonymous systems are just technolo-
gists, they aren’t philosophers or sociologists, their decisions are 
not completely thought through—they don’t consider all possible 
thoughts going through their heads. The efficiency of developing 
a product suffers from not having all eyes on everything. In 
extreme cases, the developer won’t think of all of the problems 
(i.e., privacy or anonymity issues).”
This again creates an instability in the user’s sense of anonymity, 
or what they think they revealed and what they think their 
receiving parties know about them. One data analyst I spoke to 
only collects information about a user’s transport routes and cell 
phone provider. He explained that he often came into conflict 
156 with his privacy team because they did not allocate enough data 
for him to use. This constant linking and cutting of information 
is at work in the tension between what the analyst is allowed to 
know, what they are allowed to invent, what they want to know, 
and what they feel is personally crossing their moral boundary of 
“knowing too much.”
Conclusion 
This paper explores the first stages of analysis in an ongoing 
description of “people who know too much,” in which I hope to 
unravel the stories of the anonymity tailors who make cuts or 
links in how anonymity is practiced online. I believe that to fully 
understand how anonymity is done today, and more generally 
how personal data are handled, qualitative research should 
investigate the nature of “cutting” data, the tools that are used 
to cut and link, and the ideologies and agendas for doing so. Fur-
ther investigation around big data should also take into account 
the voices of the software engineers, system admins, and data 
analysts who affect—both directly and indirectly—the everyday 
lives of users. Doing so will reveal what types of decisions are 
made, what types of battles are played out, and what obstacles 
exist when handling personal data. This description of the 
affective dimensions of cutting and linking can hopefully further 
reveal how anonymity is being reconfigured, and explain the 
entangled weave of the technical and the social. 
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